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Ia muamua ane lava se fale.
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Samoan proverb
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Summary
Housing wealth is the cornerstone of U.S. households’ balance sheets and the largest
store of wealth in the United States. This research examines rising housing wealth
inequality between 2005 and 2015 in an urban context. The literature suggests that rising
income inequality, rising income segregation, or racial segregation could be a cause.
Other research highlights the role of mortgage lending in generating inequality. The
subprime and foreclosure crises have a well-documented association with housing
inequality. Research also highlights risk-based mortgage pricing more generally as a
mechanism for widening inequality.
I first examine the drivers of urban housing wealth inequality with a cross-sectional
regression analysis in 2000-2005. I examine how income and racial segregation affect
housing wealth inequality between cities prior to the crisis, and find that income
inequality is weakly correlated with housing wealth inequality, but income and racial
segregation have strong effects. Then, I examine how changes in segregation explain
rising housing wealth inequality during the real estate and financial crises of the 2000s, or
if mortgage market factors explain the rise. I find that changes in income inequality lead
to higher housing wealth inequality; that rises in Black racial segregation again explain
much of the increase, and that subprime lending does not fully account for that effect.
Finally, I use individual level data in a series of quantile regressions to understand the
drivers of housing wealth inequality during the housing market recovery years of 2010-
2015. I find that risk-based mortgage pricing and income segregation significantly
xiii
interact to produce significant and meaningfully large increases in housing wealth
inequality over a 5-year period, from 2010-2015.
In Chapter 5, I briefly discuss the ramifications for national housing finance reform, as
well as for state and local mortgage programs and policies like inclusionary/exclusionary
zoning. The current administration has put housing finance reform at the top of its
agenda. Many proposals suggest partial or complete privatization of the government
sponsored enterprises (GSE)s, which would lead to increase in risk-based pricing and
market segmentation. Additionally, reform could disrupt GSE subsidization of state and
local mortgage revenue bond programs. State and local actors should seek to preserve
these capacities through the budgetary process and housing finance reform; and scale up
local programs to guarantee mortgages and provide down payment assistance where
possible.  Cities should weigh carefully the costs of exclusionary zoning not only on
income segregation, but on widening wealth inequality within their region.
This dissertation contributes to the literature by situating the phenomenon of rising
housing wealth inequality in a spatial context and describing the impact of individual,
neighborhood, and regional characteristics on the production of housing wealth
inequality. I also tie these results to policy remedies at the national and local levels.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Wealth inequality is growing in the United States. Three decades of eroding middle class
wealth – in particular, housing wealth - is a key factor (Saez & Zucman, 2014). The
magnitude of housing wealth as an asset class is such that changes in the distribution of
housing wealth has the power to drive overall wealth inequality. Housing wealth – the
difference between the current market value and the outstanding debt against one’s home
- constitutes over half of household balance sheets. As of 2014 Q4 Flow of Funds data,
U.S. housing wealth stands at 11.25 trillion, roughly 64% of GDP.
Recently, housing wealth has become much more unequal.  The richest 20% now have
nine times the home equity of the middle 20%. Thirty years ago that ratio was five to one
(A. Mian & Sufi, 2014). As of 2010, 60% of housing equity was held by the top quartile
of the income distribution, compared to 6% held by the bottom quartile (S. J. Smith &
Searle, 2010). This upward trend began in 1995.
Because the dynamics of wealth accumulation are thought to lead to a higher degree of
concentration than the dynamics of income, the ratio between returns to wealth and
returns to income govern overall economic inequality (Piketty & Goldhammer, 2014).
Returns to wealth have begun to outpace returns to income in the current era;
preliminary research suggests that housing appears to be the primary driver of this
growing gap (Rognlie, 2014). As a key component of the nation’s finances and of
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households’ wealth accumulation strategy, growing inequality in housing wealth is
increasing overall economic inequality (Rognlie, 2014).
What is housing wealth? Housing wealth is the difference between the current market
value of a home and any debt against that asset. Because housing is the largest purchase
most households make, often the only leveraged asset, and for many, the only investment
of any kind, housing wealth forms the majority of household portfolios. There are
multiple ways in which homeownership helps families build home equity. Regular
mortgage payments create a forced savings effect. Housing debt and capital gains are tax
advantaged. When land prices are increasing, homeownership allows households to avoid
rental increases and capture the benefits of rising land prices.  Housing is a leveraged
investment, meaning that the return on the down payment can be quite large, particularly
in an environment where mortgage rates are subsidized. Conversely, in non-recourse
states, where lenders’ only avenue to resolving delinquent loans is foreclosure, regardless
of whether the debt outstanding exceeds the value of the home, the borrowers’ downside
risk is limited. That is, families can only lose what they initially ventured.  Finally,
housing allows homeowners to convert effort expended on home improvements – “sweat
equity” – into financial equity.
Housing wealth is a financial concept, but the dynamics of housing wealth accumulation
are not governed solely by financial and economic concerns. Social facts dominate the
distribution of housing wealth and the performance of housing as an asset. Racial
minorities tend to have less wealth than White households and to hold less of that wealth
in stocks and more in housing.  Prior to 2005, homes formed 44% of median White
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households net worth and 56% of net worth for Black households (Flippen, 2004). This
differential exposure to housing wealth has the potential to generate converging fortunes
in the wealth position of these groups. If home prices were to rise equally for all
homeowners (and at a faster rate than other sorts of investments), groups with higher
exposure to housing would accumulate wealth at a faster rate than groups with less
exposure. However, research into the housing wealth gap between Black and White
households show it has been growing, not closing. A recent NAACP study uses Oaxaca
decomposition and the Survey of Consumer Finances data to determine that, in the
current era, while years of White homeownership contribute positively to household
wealth, Black households have not had the same ability to grow home equity over time.
Years of homeownership were responsible for over 25% of the racial wealth gap, while
income accounted for just 20%; education and gifts accounted for 5% apiece (Shapiro,
Meschede, & Osoro, 2013). Other research cites divergent returns to homeownership as
the number one contributor to the growing wealth gap between White and Black families
(Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Taylor, Kochhar, Fry, Velasco, & Motel, 2011).
This research is motivated by the theoretical framework of financialization, which relies
on institutionalist or political economy approaches. Financialization theory asserts that
the last half century has been defined by the increasing importance of financial firms, the
importance of financial processes, and accelerated financial deepening. Financialization
scholars find that financial deepening will be accompanied by widening inequality
(Arrighi, 1994; Krippner, 2005).  The financialization of housing markets has focused
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particularly on the practice of risk-based pricing as a factor which might amplify
inequality (Aalbers, 2008).
Home equity - the degree to which people actually own their homes, as opposed to
effectively renting them from lenders, has significance for those interested in determining
the class orientation of homeowners. Marxist political economy tends to collapse
homeowners into rentiers and renters. In the second case, the financial terms of
homeownership are such that accumulation is not possible. Due to predatory lending,
slumlords have been replaced by bankers; mortgagors find themselves in the position of
renters, who pay rent to the bank and are not able to accumulate wealth through their
investment. In this view, housing provides the illusion of property ownership, channeling
working class aspirations towards capitalism without providing material benefits. (E
Wyly, Hammel, & Atia, 2004; Elvin Wyly, Moos, Hammel, & Kabahizi, 2009).
Recently, financialization scholars have argued that the infrastructure of mortgage
markets has shifted away from facilitating individual homeownership and towards
facilitating corporate profits. If the 1920s and 1930s saw the creation of institutions to
enable widespread middle class homeownership, the 1970s onwards saw these
institutions repurposed to enable the corporate ownership of bundles of homes, nominally
to provide liquidity to the primary mortgage market (Aalbers, 2008; Immergluck, 2011;
Krippner, 2005; Levitin, 2013). A shift in the architecture of homeownership and
mortgage finance should have ramifications for the distribution of housing wealth and
inequality, though our understanding of how this plays out is still unfolding (Carruthers
& Kim, 2011).
5
The institutionalist view emphasizes that homeownership provides the middle class with
real opportunities for accumulation. This opportunity is sufficient for class formation,
thereby providing a set of material interests which are distinct from rentiers and renters.
Housing is viewed as property, a source of accumulation, but also a commodity which
owner-occupiers use and consume (Thorns, 1981). Tracing back to Weber, this approach
analyzes how the institutional framework of homeownership in this country allocates
housing wealth by place, race, and class, and how housing and mortgage markets
contribute to the material basis for the formation of conflicting political interests. For
example, if one racial group is systematically able to benefit from housing as an
investment, while another is not, this uneven set of opportunities could pit the two groups
against one another in a political competition for control of urban space. This institutional
framework places the potential for accumulation at the center of questions of class
formation. How is housing wealth allocated? Who is allowed to benefit, and how have
recent institutional shifts altered the distribution of home equity (Aalbers, 2008; G.
Dymski, Hernandez, & Mohanty, 2013; Fox O'mahony & Overton, 2014; Thorns, 1981)?
The current institutional framework for housing in the United States was formed over the
course of the twentieth century. There are three distinct policy eras which structured
housing wealth accumulation in the United States. The first era stretches from the New
Deal to the 1970s as the federal government worked to promote homeownership,
particularly in newly constructed suburbs. The second era stretches from the 1970s to the
1990s. During this time, Fair Housing legislation reduced formal supports for segregation
and ended policies which excluded racial minorities from mortgage markets. In the
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1990s, deregulation and technological change prompted the shift from credit rationing to
risk-based pricing and the rise of subprime lending and private label securitization. These
changes restructured mortgage finance, culminating in the real estate and financial crises
of the 2000s and the housing market slump that has persisted through the 2010s.
Following the widespread foreclosures of the Great Depression, a series of mortgage
institutions were created to reshape mortgage markets. These institutions extended the
benefits of homeownership to a wider audience and provided stable pathways for low and
middle class families to accumulate housing wealth. Beginning in 1930, the Federal
Home Loan Banks provided a conduit from capital rich urban areas to the local network
of Building and Loans (B&Ls) responsible for lending to prospective homeowners.
Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance created a standardized mortgage
product with characteristics appealing to both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers
benefited from the predictable, low, fixed payments of the 30-year fixed rate loan.
Lenders benefited from a reduction in lending costs as mortgages were consolidated into
one popular product, and federally subsidized insurance reduced lenders’ exposure to
risky borrowers. Federal Housing Authority (FHA) insurance was complemented with
the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) four years later.
FNMA purchased FHA insured loans from banks and other lenders, further capitalizing
mortgage lenders. These interventions, alongside others – the creation of the Veterans
Administration lending program, FNMA’s partner institution, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) which initiated mortgage securitization – resulted in a rise in the
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homeownership rate from 48% in 1930 to 65% in the late 1970s. Government efforts to
expand homeownership to moderate income households are fixtures in the U.S. housing
and mortgage markets. FHA insures roughly 15% of mortgages (FHA, 2012). Leading
up to the crisis, FNMA and FHLMC combined hold or have securitized roughly 40% of
the market, and that share has grown to nearly 50% since (FHFA, 2014; Immergluck,
2011; Squires, 1992).
Unfortunately, while these institutions were effective in expanding the benefits of
homeownership to moderate income households, racial exclusion was widespread in
policy design. Redlining, which prevented lending in majority-minority neighborhoods in
the inner city, was introduced with the Home Owners Loan Corporation in the 1930s, and
was continued with FHA insurance and VA mortgage products through the 1970s. These
programs amplified White flight and the suburbanization of middle income, White
households (Jackson, 1985; Kruse, 2013; Sharkey, 2013). The result of practices like
redlining were broad racial disparities in homeownership, housing wealth, and
neighborhood well-being. Researchers and activists advocated for equal treatment in
housing and fair access to credit, arguing this would provide a pathway to greater
economic equality, among other benefits. These efforts resulted in landmark legislation
and programs, including the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and the Community Reinvestment Act. Research
suggests that these policy changes were effective in improving homeownership rates
among minority families, resulting in a reduction in Black-White segregation in
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particular, and expanding housing and mortgage choice (Immergluck, 2011; Squires,
1992).
Two key trends have emerged since the 1970s. The first is that Black-White racial
segregation declined following civil rights reforms of the late 1960s and 1970s, while
income sorting1 increased. As explicit legal and institutional support for exclusionary
zoning, redlining, and other tools of segregation declined, and as income inequality has
increased, segregation has become increasingly driven by distributed decisions in the
market for residential housing (Massey, 2012). The second key trend is the emergence of
subprime lending. Following financial deregulation and technological advances in the
1990s, subprime lending emerged as a new mortgage product. In response to rising
demand for high-risk mortgages in the secondary mortgage market, subprime purchase
and refinance mortgages were heavily marketed in minority neighborhoods in cities
where racial segregation remains elevated (Rugh, Albright, & Massey, 2015; Rugh &
Massey, 2010). Multiple MSA and city-level studies have demonstrated that subprime
loans are powerfully associated with racial segregation, even after controlling for a
variety of housing, borrower and neighborhood characteristics (Calem, Gillen, &
Wachter, 2004; Immergluck, 2011; Rugh & Massey, 2010; Squires, Hyra, & Renner,
1 Throughout the text I use income sorting and income segregation interchangably. The terms emerge from
separate strands of theory, but refer to the same phenomenon. Sorting was used by economists Shelling and
Tiebout to describe particular mechanisms for residential self-selection into cohesive groups; income
segregation is used more generally to describe residential clustering by income.
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2009). The subprime and foreclosure crises have radically restructured housing markets
and increased inequality in housing wealth. Because of the racialized nature of subprime
lending and the devastating effect that clustered foreclosures and blight had on segregated
neighborhoods, and because of additional factors to do with the recovery that are still
being uncovered, the housing recovery has been disproportionately difficult in minority
areas.
At the national level, housing wealth inequality has widened along class and racial lines
over the last thirty years. A recent report by Brandeis on growing wealth inequality cites
divergent returns to homeownership as the number one contributor to the growing wealth
gap between White and Black families. In their thirty-year timeframe, this gap grows by
more than $150,000. The authors attribute the bulk of this widening gap to housing and
the effect of the housing crisis (Shapiro et al., 2013). Other research confirms that the
housing crisis hit Black households hardest. During the downturn, the median net worth
of Black families in the five hardest hit states declined by 76%; this figure was 48%
nationwide. Whites, by contrast lost 44% of their net worth in the five hardest hit states,
and just 8% nationwide (Taylor et al., 2011).  While these declines reflect losses from a
peak that was undoubtedly inflated and not representative of real housing wealth, the
racial discrepancies in these losses are stark.
Housing wealth is a cornerstone of the American middle class and a key component of
rising economic inequality. Over the past thirty years, housing wealth has become more
unequally distributed between income groups and between races. The changing bases of
racial segregation, the concomitant rise in income sorting, and the vicissitudes of
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subprime lending are all plausible contributors to rising housing wealth inequality.
Research has confirmed that in aggregate, housing inequality is widening between races
and classes. Research has also confirmed that home values and mortgage prices are
governed by metropolitan-level factors and linked to segregation and income sorting.
However, no research has attempted to understand how urban processes contributes to the
dynamics that generate housing wealth.
In this research, I examine the relationship between racial and income segregation, and
housing wealth inequality. I construct a dataset of individual housing wealth across the
nation and with this data, measure the distribution of home values and home equity by
urban region. This research provides descriptive data about the geographic distribution of
housing wealth, measuring how housing wealth is distributed within major American
cities, evaluating whether there are regions where net housing wealth is more or less
equally distributed, and comparing the distribution of housing wealth to the distribution
of income.
With this dataset, I use spatial variation to analyze the relationship between racial and
income segregation and housing wealth inequality. In particular, I evaluate whether
inequality in housing wealth is completely driven by income inequality, or if sorting and
segregation have a separate effect. Finally, assuming sorting and segregation do have an
effect, I investigate whether mortgage finance is a mechanism by which income and race
based segregation impacts housing wealth inequality.
The major research questions I address are:
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1. Does regional housing wealth inequality merely reflect income inequality or does
income sorting also contribute?
2. Does mortgage lending explain why racial segregation amplifies housing wealth
inequality separately from income sorting?
3. Do income sorting and mortgage lending amplify housing wealth inequality?
In chapters 2 and 3, I examine regional housing wealth inequality in a series of cross
sectional analyses of Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) level housing wealth
inequality. Chapter 2 addresses question 1, examining the drivers of urban housing
wealth inequality in 2005. In this period, just prior to the housing crisis, I inspect the
relationship between housing wealth inequality and urban racial and income segregation
or sorting. Chapter 3 addresses Question 2, and probes the role of the foreclosure crisis in
generating housing wealth inequality, addressing the impact of subprime lending and the
foreclosure crisis on housing wealth inequality during and following the crash. Then, in
Chapter 4, I address question 3 with individual-level data to estimate housing wealth
inequality in 2015 among individuals who originated mortgages in 2010, investigating
regional, neighborhood, and individual drivers of inequality using a set of borrowers who
were unlikely to have obtained subprime mortgages.
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Chapter 2: Income Inequality, Segregation and Urban Housing Wealth
Inequality Before the Crash (2000-2005)
Introduction
Home equity is the foundation of American household wealth, and inequality in wealth
has been rising since 1995. Some theories suggest that housing wealth inequality would
primarily be driven by income inequality. Others expect income segregation to be an
important component of market segmentation and uneven home price appreciation. Still
others focus on racial segregation as a major component of uneven accumulation of
housing wealth. In this section, I ask how income inequality and racial segregation affect
housing wealth inequality. I use cross sectional regressions of MSAs in the United States
in the early 2000s to understand how spatial variation in income inequality and different
residential patterns of segregation correspond with higher and lower levels of housing
wealth inequality. I examine urban housing markets in the lead up to the housing market
crisis of the late 2000s. During this period, risk-based pricing was high, and though the
foreclosure crisis of the 1990s was ongoing, housing market distress was not yet
widespread.
Literature Review
This literature review describes research on the factors that drive unequal financial
returns to homeownership within and between urban areas. The four components of
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housing equity are the value of the home, the cost and amortization of mortgage, the
degree of leverage, and the ability of the homeowner to take advantage of tax benefits
such as the mortgage interest tax deduction. Some researchers define housing wealth in a
way that takes into account imputed rent, the value of housing services, the ability to
transform sweat equity of home improvements into capital, and the ability to borrow
cheaply using home equity lines of credit. Those types of mechanisms are outside the
scope of this study, except to the extent that all three can be capitalized into the value of
the home. While this study evaluates the financial returns to homeownership,
homeownership can be the pathway to other non-financial benefits that are not within the
scope of this study. These benefits include access to better quality housing than what is
offered in the rental market; shorter commutes and expanded job search opportunities;
higher quality schools and other neighborhood amenities. The focus of this research is on
the financial returns to homeownership, so again, these attributes will only be considered
to the extent that they are capitalized into price.
Because home price appreciation is a strong determinant of housing wealth, I will begin
by discussing the literature which explains variation in home prices within cities.   I will
follow by discussing the cost and distribution of mortgage finance, and finally by
describing studies which directly examine patterns in home equity.
Market Segmentation
Market segmentation is one way to conceptualize uneven home price growth within a city
or region. Market segments or submarkets have commonly been defined by housing type,
geography, and price point. If housing submarkets cater to different consumers, and offer
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goods that poorly substitute for one another, then these markets will appreciate and
depreciate at different rates and respond differently to changes in supply and demand.
Early literature on market segmentation describes urban housing markets as being
segmented by quality, such that not all houses are viewed by buyers as substitute goods,
leading to a situation in which shocks to one submarket ripple though the rest of the
system depending on how that market is related to other submarkets through
substitutability. Demand is heterogeneous too; renters have a demand function based on
consumption while owner-occupiers have a demand function based on the investment and
consumption aspects of housing.
One source of segmentation is by home value. Markets for high and low cost housing can
become distinct because low income buyers cannot afford expensive homes. Conversely
wealthy households are not interested in low cost homes. Herbert and Belsky (2008)
summarize a set of studies about home price appreciation among different market
segments. One set of studies review home price appreciation by price tier, finding no
consistent differences in home price appreciation; another finds that low value homes are
more likely to experience strong growth. Another set of studies reviews price
appreciation by structure type, contrasting single family homes with condominiums,
finding that these dynamics are specific to place and time period. Di and Liu (2007),
using PSID, and Krumm and Kelly (1989), using the Survey of Consumer Finances, find
that during the 1990s, the returns to homeownership are greater for high income families
than low income families. Belsky and Duda (2002) analyze whether low cost housing
appreciates at the same rate as other housing using a panel which matches purchase and
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sales in Boston, Denver, Philadelphia and Chicago. They do not account for the effect of
amortization on equity buildup. They find that in all four cities, low cost homes
appreciate far more strongly than mid and high cost homes. Their study points to the
importance of the timing of purchases and sales as a key determinant of whether
homeowners made a nominal profit or loss on the sale of their homes. Low income
households tend to have shorter spells of homeownership, increasing the impact of
transaction costs, and sensitivity to the financial impact of the timing of purchases and
sales, particularly because low income households are generally unable to take advantage
of the mortgage interest tax deduction. Another key factor is location. The study
confirmed that the probability that low-cost home buyers to made a profit varied strongly
by Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
Another source of segmentation emerges from the demand side. McMillen (2008)
investigates home price change within one city, Chicago, between 1995 and 2005.  Over
this time period, the percentage of expensive homes increased. McMillen reviews two
hypotheses as to why the shape of the distribution changed. The first hypothesis is that
this change in the distribution is due to supply, or changes in the housing stock. The
second that it is due to changes in demand for housing due to shifts in the preference and
income distribution of residents. Using an Oaxaca decomposition analysis, McMillen
finds that housing stock and locational change do not explain this shift; rather a shift in
demand for high end homes explains the change in the distribution. Housing demand can
also be stratified by age and family status, and these demographic differences can lead to
uneven home price growth. Different demographic groups require different public
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amenities – for example, proximity to jobs, hospitals, or good elementary schools. Case
and Mayer (1996) study intra-metropolitan home price dynamics in Boston in the 1990s
and find that rapid changes in demographics and slower changes in local amenities and
housing stock lead to a mismatch between supply and demand, causing prices to change
along jurisdictional lines. As households aged, the need for good schools declined, and
places with strong school districts declined while towns with amenities suited to retiring
households appreciated.
In a national study, Boehm and Schlottmann (2008) find that housing wealth increases
with income. They estimate a dynamic model of family wealth accumulation using
PSID’s longitudinal data on household wealth from 1984-1992. They focus on the impact
of home purchase timing on the probability of acquiring housing wealth, considering the
propensity of different socioeconomic groups to have “spells” of homeownership
intermixed with spells of renting. After splitting their sample into four groups by race
(White, Black) and income (above median, below median), they observe that housing
appreciation is roughly the same for all groups. They evaluate housing wealth gains
between socioeconomic groups and against other forms of wealth. They find that average
annual housing wealth accumulation increases with socioeconomic status.
Overall, investigations of intra-metropolitan home price dynamics have not revealed
systematic patterns in how different market segments respond to cyclical price
movements. In some regions, the housing cycle was observed to result in high volatility
for expensive homes; in others, that volatility is associated with low cost housing (Belsky
& Duda, 2002; Case & Mayer, 1996; Li & Rosenblatt, 1997).
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Racial Segregation, Income Sorting and Home Prices
There is a long literature establishing that racial segregation and income sorting are key
determinants of uneven home price appreciation. The classic model of segregation is that
it is the result of institutionalized, structural rules which are enforced by a variety of
government and private sector players (Massey, 1993).  Institutional discrimination in
housing markets has been conceptualized in a variety of ways – as “collective action
racism” by some (Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 1999), and as a component of “place
stratification” by others. Collective action racism draws on political economy and refers
to exclusionary zoning, racial covenants, and other institutions put in place by racist
majorities to enforce segregation. Place stratification describes these same institutions,
but also incorporates a concept of a hierarchy of places, and the role that zoning, housing
associations, deed covenants and other institutions play in enforcing spatial order (Logan
& Molotch, 2007). Initially formulated to explain White flight and suburbanization, this
concept has been adapted to understand the hierarchy of places within the suburbs. The
group threat theory can be combined with place stratification to suggest that racial
majorities work more intensely to enforce segregation in cities that have a large, unified
minority population (Bellman, 2014; Blalock, 1967; Pais, South, & Crowder, 2012).
Institutionalized segregation can generate uneven home prices by reducing competition
for housing in White areas, lowering prices. By creating pent-up demand in minority
neighborhoods and simultaneously restricting supply, segregation may generate increased
prices for minorities (Cutler et al., 1999). Viewed solely from the lens of home equity,
these price movements could have the effect of raising home equity for minority
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homeowners, and reducing home equity for majority homeowners. The opposite effect
would occur when segregation is paired with unequal access to public goods like
mortgage finance, transportation, education, and other amenities (Lindstrom, 1997).
These amenities are capitalized into price, and bid up prices in high status areas and
decrease prices in low status areas. This price effect will be true so long as preferences
for amenities are homogenous. To the extent that they are not, households may reach a
sorting equilibrium that is not reflected in price (Yinger, 2015).
Since fair housing reforms of the 1960s, institutional segregation has declined and
decentralized forms of segregation have become increasingly prevalent (Massey,
Rothwell, & Domina, 2009). Scholarly work has turned to forms of segregation which
arise out of individual preferences, socioeconomic differences and the atomized
competition within the market for land. Thomas Schelling (1971) provided an early
model for segregation emerging from residential preferences. Using a simple
checkerboard with two types of coins, Shelling created decision rules for the two types of
residents based on their preferred racial mix of their immediate surroundings. The model
demonstrated that even if almost all residents prefer to live in an integrated
neighborhood, slight preferences for the degree of racial mix can result in high levels of
segregation without the presence of active discrimination in any other arena of housing
markets or residential choice.
Another framework for understanding of the aggregate impact of individual location
preferences is spatial assimilation.  Spatial assimilation situates individual preferences in
a social context. In this view, the economic and cultural differences among minorities
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that may lead them to choose to live in segregated areas, and a multigenerational
acculturation process which is thought to lead to home buying and neighborhood
attainment, among other forms of integration (Charles, 2005; Friedman, Tsao, & Chen,
2013; Pais et al., 2012).
When racial segregation is the result of individual preferences, this decentralized
segregation can result in lower home prices in areas that are predominantly inhabited by
racial and ethnic minorities if these groups have lower incomes and lower ability to
compete for homes in desirable neighborhoods. Another possibility is that even if
incomes are roughly equal, if the majority group prefers not to buy homes in minority
areas, this will result in lower prices in those places. If segregation results in two separate
markets, it’s thought that commodities sold by minorities will not command as high a
price because there are fewer buyers. This effect is thought to be related to the relative
size of the buying pool – the “returns to trade” with the majority increases the larger the
majority is relative to the minority (Becker, 1971).
Segregation solely by income or wealth is often called sorting (Davidoff, 2005; Tiebout,
1956; Yinger, 2015). There are a variety of ways that income sorting is thought to occur
and simultaneously, to affect home prices. The bid rent curve suggests that commuting
costs are capitalized into home prices, such that wealthy people will sort into the suburbs
so long as the income elasticity of transportation costs are less than the income elasticity
of home size (Brueckner, 1987). Amenity-based models propose that home prices reflect
the quality of a home’s location, with higher prices paid to live near parks and lower
prices offered for homes near sources of pollution. Tiebout sorting between jurisdictions
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is thought to occur when households capitalize public goods that vary by jurisdiction into
home prices (Dawkins, 2005; Tiebout, 1956). Shelling sorting has been expanded to
describe households’ preferences to live near certain kinds of people. When neighbors
themselves are the amenity, the process of income sorting becomes dynamic and path
dependent (Cutler et al., 1999; Massey et al., 2009).
Rising income inequality amplifies whichever mechanisms govern income sorting. As the
gulf between rich and poor grows, households of different income cohorts become even
less likely to pay similar amounts for location-related attributes, and residential
segregation by income becomes more complete (McMillen, 2008). Not only does most
economic theory predict that rising income inequality will result in stronger income
sorting, but so long as preferences are homogenous, home prices are the mechanism by
which sorting will occur (Watson, 2009; Yinger, 2015).
Trends in Segregation and Sorting
Institutionalized segregation, which tended to create barriers along jurisdictional lines or
between city and suburb, declined strongly after the Fair Housing Act was passed.
Wilson (1987)’s The Truly Disadvantaged describes this period of modest desegregation
for middle class Blacks. As middle class Blacks were able to escape segregation, and as
manufacturing jobs fled overseas, the poor were left behind in the inner city in
neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. Wilson’s work emphasized economic
distinctions as a key barrier for Blacks and Whites escaping poverty, and was interpreted
by some to deemphasize the importance of race.
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Massey and Denton’s 1993 book American Apartheid re-established the importance of
racial segregation as a force which interacted with structural changes in the economy, and
with poverty to create the persistent underclass (Charles, 2003; Jargowsky, 1997; Massey
et al., 2009; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Wilson, 2012).   How does racial segregation persist
in the absence of explicit legal support? In part this is the result of subtler forms of
discrimination in housing markets which still exist. There is a long literature
demonstrating that racial discrimination and segregation are reproduced at every step of
the home purchase process – from realtor behavior (Immergluck, 2011) to mortgage
prices (Rugh & Massey, 2010) to zoning decisions and the choice to annex or form new
jurisdictions (J. T. Rothwell & Massey, 2010) .
Another source is the rise of segregation which results from individual preferences for
neighborhood composition as described by Schelling (1971) and others. In an empirical
examination, Charles (2005) examines three drivers of preferences for neighborhood
racial mix. The first is that race is a visible marker for class, and that residents attempt to
select neighbors of higher economic class, using race as a marker. The second is that all
races are ethnocentric and prefer to live near people like themselves. The third draws on
Hubert Blumer’s theory of race as a method of maintaining group status. Blumer’s theory
establishes a group hierarchy, with Whites at the top, Blacks at the bottom, and other
races between. Individuals avoid races with lower status in an effort to maintain group
position. In order to understand the influence of different drivers of segregation, Charles
(2005) analyses data on preferences for neighborhood racial mix in the Multi-City Study
of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), drawn from Atlanta, Detroit, Boston and Los Angeles in
22
1992-1993. The MCSUI results confirm that racial prejudice is a stronger driver of
residential segregation than in-group attachment or perceived economic differences
between races. Racial prejudice is confirmed as a particularly strong driver of Whites’
residential preferences, and less so for those of other races.
Levels of racial segregation vary widely between metropolitan areas and individual cities
may depart from national, secular trends (Bellman, 2014; Bischoff & Reardon, 2013;
Reardon et al., 2008). For example, Watson (2009) finds that outside of the South,
income sorting is lower for Blacks in cities with higher racial segregation.  When the
concept of segregation is split into five distinct dimensions of spatial variation:
unevenness, exposure, clustering, concentration and centralization, a variety of patterns
emerge (Massey, 2012). Some cities display rising levels of racial and economic
integration, others falling into the category of hyper segregation (Massey & Tannen,
2015), with high levels of Black-White segregation along most or all dimensions. Some
regions are seemingly integrated when measured at larger spatial scales, but seemingly
segregated when measured at the neighborhood or block level.
There is a long literature examining the impact of Black-White segregation on uneven
home price movements through the impact of market segmentation on supply and/or
demand. Cutler et al. (1999) investigate whether segregation is the result of “collective
action racism” enforced through legal and other measures, or if segregation is the result
of voluntary, Shelling-style sorting of Whites into predominantly White areas. They
propose that in the first case, Whites will pay more for housing because demand for
housing in White areas will be higher. In the second case, they reason that Blacks will
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pay more because segregation constrains supply for Black housing, concentrating
demand for housing in a few neighborhoods. The authors find that prior to 1970, in
segregated cities, Blacks paid more for housing than Whites, but in the later period,
Whites paid more for housing in segregated cities than Blacks.
Rusk (2001) describes how housing wealth might amplify income inequality in the
existence of race based segregation. Rusk calculates the ratio between income and
housing value by race. He finds that this ratio is much lower for Black homeowners than
White homeowners, and dubs the discrepancy between the two the “segregation tax”.
Rusk conducts a linear regression using census-tract level data for the 100 largest metro
areas in 2000, examining the impact of a dissimilarity and isolation indices on the
segregation tax. The dissimilarity index calculates the proportion of members of a given
racial group who would have to move for that racial group to be distributed evenly across
a given area. The isolation index indicates the average racial mix of the places in which
members of a given group live. Rusk (2001) demonstrates that after controlling for
household income, the Black-White gap in housing values increases with segregation,
though the impact of other minority groups’ racial segregation did not lead to any
conclusive results. In a similar study, Raymond, Wang, and Immergluck (2015) find that
zip code level segregation is the predominant explanation for home price volatility and
persistent recession through the 2000-2015 housing bubble, crisis, and recovery. These
results hold even after controlling for income, housing stock composition and quality.
Dong and Hansz (2015) control for regional and urban form variables, which do help
explain the depth and duration of the housing crisis. They find that the impact of racial
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composition is highly dependent on whether subprime lending is included in the model,
suggesting that in the current crisis, uneven home price movements in racially segregated
areas is mediated by the dynamics of predatory mortgage lending.
Flippen (2004) examines whether and why Black-owned homes might appreciate more
slowly than White owned homes. She notes that while three studies conducted in the
1960s and 1970s found lower rates of home price appreciation for Blacks, though two
studies conducted in the late 1970s found no difference when controlling for other
observable factors.  She differentiates between three different mechanisms which could
cause a racial gap in home price appreciation. The first potential cause is that, following
Becker (1971), racial neighborhood composition could lower the appreciation of Black-
owned homes if White households have a ‘taste’ for White neighbors, reducing market
demand and home price for Black-owned homes. Second, neighborhood transition could
be associated with a certain pattern of home price appreciation. Third, if race is highly
correlated with neighborhood amenities, home prices could reflect the location of the
homes, and not their occupants. Flippen estimates a hedonic model using neighborhood
racial composition, neighborhood change, and measures of neighborhood amenities. She
finds that all three factors appear to influence home prices. Minority presence was
negatively associated with home price appreciation, as were increases in minorities over
time, over and above controls for quality of housing stock and neighborhood quality.
Oliver and Shapiro (2006) find that Black-owned homes are lower priced and appreciate
more slowly than homes in White neighborhoods. They examine home price appreciation
for Black and White homeowners nationwide from 1967-1988 and find that White-owned
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home price appreciation was almost twice that of Blacks. This gap persisted when
controlling roughly for price cohort, and when examining the 1960s and 1970s
separately. They tie their results to segregation, and to discrimination in mortgage
markets, but do not explicitly control for these factors.
There’s a long literature associating segregation and sorting with uneven home price
movements. The majority of the works cited suggest that homes in segregated areas are
appreciating more slowly than those in majority White areas, with the exception of the
gentrification of inner city areas which are experiencing rapid neighborhood transition.
As the nation shifts from legally established segregation to income sorting and racial
segregation driven by individual preferences, some empirical work suggests that the
impact of segregation on home values will reverse. In the contemporary era, segregated
areas may tend to suffer from depressed demand. Other research focus on the continued
impact of fragmentation and exclusionary zoning as key drivers of residential inequality.
This literature review suggests that several reasons why the distribution of housing equity
in urban areas has been growing more unequal. Growing income inequality generates
higher gaps between submarkets, as wealthier groups pay more for desired amenities, and
poorer groups cannot. More complete income sorting should be another effect of rising
income inequality. At the same time, income sorting may reflect intense competition by
elites for local amenities or jurisdictional level public goods. So, the mechanisms that
translate income inequality into home price inequality include competition for high end
housing; competition for shorter commutes and associated transportation costs;
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competition for desirable public goods provided at the jurisdiction level; and competition
for place-based amenities including neighborhood composition itself.
In places where race-based segregation is high, as the nature of race based segregation
has shifted from a macro level force through “collective action racism” and towards one
which is organized through decentralized sorting, the relationship between segregation
and home price appreciation may have changed. Where neighborhoods self-sort into
racially and ethnically segregated spaces, we might expect slower home price
appreciation in majority Black neighborhoods and higher home price appreciation in
majority White neighborhoods (Cutler et al., 1999). These theories suggest that in an era
of rising income equality, and reduced state level segregation, the enforcement of fair
housing laws may result in diverging home prices and widening housing wealth
inequality.
Simultaneously, the rise of risk-based pricing and the geographic distribution of
predatory lending may contribute to housing wealth inequality through the uneven spatial
distribution of debt and risk. In places where mortgage finance has been denied or
overpriced, and in particular where subprime lending was densest, we should expect the
greatest declines in housing equity. This effect should occur in part because borrowers
are paying inflated prices for loans, and in part because clustered foreclosures and
vacancies continue to weigh down local housing market recovery. In the post-crisis era,
risk-based pricing may have an effect as well, as wealthy households clustered into the
wealthiest neighborhoods of the wealthiest cities receive the cheapest debt, while
neighborhoods of poorer households are charged more, and build equity more slowly.
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There has been little work examining the urban processes which generate social
stratification in housing wealth. Although metropolitan factors are indicated as drivers of
housing wealth inequality, here has been no research into relationship between income
sorting, racial segregation and the intra-metropolitan distribution of housing wealth. The
growing liberalization of housing and mortgage markets against a backdrop of rising
inequality has led to higher spatial sorting, and more risk-based pricing. This research
seeks to examine whether patterns of self-sorting lead to rising inequality, or whether
other culprits: traditional institutionalized racial segregation can explain the rising
housing wealth gap. This research investigates housing wealth inequality in a spatial
context, with particular attention paid to how racial and economic segregation predict
housing wealth inequality. The literature suggests three potential relationships between
segregation and the distribution of housing wealth.
1. Housing wealth mirrors widening income inequality but plays no role in
enhancing or mitigating inequality generated in labor markets.
Figure 1: Income Inequality causes Housing Wealth Inequality
2. Economic segregation leads to rising home prices for the wealthy and
stagnating home prices for the less well to do, above and beyond income
inequality, due to social stratification processes (G. A. Dymski, 2009); and/or
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housing price externalities which amplify the impact of economic sorting
(Immergluck & Smith, 2006).
Figure 2: Income Inequality, Income Segregation cause Housing Wealth Inequality
3. Particular forms of racial segregation – in particular, the ongoing shift in the
bases of segregation, from “collective action racism” which separated Blacks
and Whites of all incomes, to self-organized micro level economic and racial
segregation, are associated with decreased home price appreciation for racial
minorities and widening housing wealth inequality (Massey et al., 2009; Rugh
et al., 2015).
Figure 3: Income Inequality, Income Segregation cause Housing Wealth Inequality
In this and subsequent sections, I seek to unpack the relationships between housing
wealth inequality, income inequality, and racial segregation, using spatial variation. In
order to understand the relationship apart from the financial crisis, I analyze housing
29
markets in the period directly preceding the real estate and financial crisis. To understand
how income inequality, income and racial segregation inform housing wealth inequality,
I analyze these factors in a sample of US cities from 2000-2005, when homeownership
peaked at 69% and before the recession and the foreclosure crisis occurred. Using a panel
of 258 cities measured in the years prior to the crisis, I compare the impacts of income
inequality, income segregation, and racial segregation on housing wealth inequality.
Methods and Data
In this analysis, I seek to answer the following question: does regional housing wealth
inequality merely reflect income inequality or does income sorting also contribute?
H0: Housing Wealth Inequality mirrors the underlying income inequality in an MSA;
segregation and income sorting have no separate impact.
H1: Housing Wealth Inequality amplifies the effects of income inequality in the presence
of strong income sorting.
Some theories of home prices in the city assume that income inequality is the primary
driver of home prices, and rule out a role for spatial factors like income sorting and
segregation. Other theories suggest that clustering by income or race will impact the
distribution of home prices. To investigate these theories, I use a dataset measuring the
distribution of housing wealth in 258 MSAs across the U.S., representing 70% of
metropolitan areas. Using data on individual mortgages, purchase prices, and a home
price index, I calculate the current distribution of home equity. Equation 1 employs a
basic cross-sectional approach, using variation between MSAs to establish a relationship
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between housing wealth inequality, income inequality, income sorting, and racial
segregation.
(1) Housing Wealth Inequality2005 = α + β1 Income Inequality2000+ β 2 Income
Segregation2000 + β3 Racial Segregation2000 + β2 Age of Housing Stock2000 + β3
Owner Occupancy Rate2000 + β4 Commute Times2000 + β5 Population Density2000
+ ε
The last four covariates are included for robustness checks, to prove that third variables
which might influence both the variables of interest (income inequality, income sorting)
and the outcome variable (home equity) are not inflating the coefficients. I include two
measures of the variation in quality of housing stock, age of housing and the owner
occupancy rate. I also control for city compactness with two measures: population
density and average commute times within the MSA. To control for regional differences,
regional fixed effects are also included.
The regression is performed incrementally to demonstrate how the coefficient for income
inequality is impacted as income and racial segregation is added, and as subsequent
controls are added.
Data
To understand how income and race predict housing wealth inequality, I construct a
dataset measuring these and other important controls. I evaluate housing wealth
inequality in 2005, the earliest year for which I have reliable data. I use Census 2000 and
ACS data to collect dependent variables. The dataset is composed from several sources as
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depicted in Table 1.   Due to data availability of different datasets, the final dataset
contains observations for 258 metropolitan areas using 2000 census definitions. The
MSAs range from small metropolitan areas like Fairbanks, Alaska, to large metropolitan
areas like Atlanta, Georgia, and represent 70% of all metropolitan areas in this timeframe.
The Gini Coefficient of housing wealth inequality is constructed from the Equifax Credit
Risk Insight Servicing McDash dataset, which includes a link to data from McDash
Analytics, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Black Knight Financial Services, referred
to hereon as CRISM. This dataset combines rich data on mortgages from Lender
Processing Services (LPS) with demographic and credit report data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York’s Consumer Credit Panel, which provides individual level
credit report data collected by Equifax. The coverage is a non-scientific sample of all
mortgage-holders contained in the Lender Processing Services (LPS) dataset, covering
40-70% of all mortgage holders, depending on the year. This dataset is organized around
individuals, allowing one to total the balances on first and second liens. I exclude all
homeowners with more than one property due to the difficulty in correctly matching
mortgages with their collateral. Using location, date and price at the time of purchase, I
estimate 2005 home value using CoreLogic’s zip code level home price data. I choose
2005 because it is the earliest year prior to the crisis for which I have confidence in the
coverage of the mortgage data; in years prior to 2005, there is a strong survivor bias, such
that records prior to 2005 do not adequately capture mortgages that went into foreclosure
in later periods. This approach to using assessing market value has been widely used in
other research estimating housing value and loan to value (Adelino, Gerardi, & Willen,
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2013). The resulting measure can be thought to be a measure of housing wealth
inequality among mortgaged homeowners in 2005.
After calculating 2005 housing wealth for individuals in the sample, for each MSA I
calculate housing wealth inequality. Because housing wealth can take on negative values,
I use the Gini coefficient. For a group of n individuals with a housing wealth of x for
each individual i, the Gini coefficient is defined as:
The Gini coefficient measures the area described by the cumulative density function and
a 45-degree line, with 1 being the highest possible inequality, and 0 being complete
equality. Where negative values are an issue, as in housing wealth, the Gini coefficient
can take on values above 1; and when mean wealth is below zero, the Gini coefficient can
take on values below zero (Jenkins, 2005).
To measure income inequality, I use the earliest available year calculating the Gini
coefficient of income inequality from the American Community Survey of the Census.
To measure income segregation, I use Herfindahl’s index on the segregation of wealth at
the census tract level, drawing on Brown University’s Diversity and Disparity Project
datasets on income segregation using Census 2000 data. The Herfindahl-Hirshmann
index is defined as follows. When s is the share of each minority group i and n is the
number of groups. The isolation of affluence and poverty can be measured
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Both the isolation of poverty and affluence have reasons to influence housing wealth
inequality. The isolation of affluence can create pockets of extremely high home prices,
and by removing wealthy buyers from other segments of the housing market, can
generate declines elsewhere. The isolation of poverty could reduce neighborhood
competition between wealthier homeowners. Because the wealthy are more likely than
the poor to be homeowners; and because of high collinearity between the isolation of
poverty and racial segregation, I choose to include the isolation of wealth in this model.
To understand racial and ethnic segregation I look at Black, Asian and Hispanic
residential patterns using isolation indices. If ai represents the racial or ethnic group
population of a census tract, ti represents the total population of the census tract, Ai
represents the total population of the metropolitan area, and entire geographic region,
then the isolation index is defined as:
I = ∑ (ai / A) (ai / ti)
From the same Diversity and Disparities 2000 dataset I draw a series of metrics on racial
isolation. I use Black-Black isolation index, which can be thought to measure the average
percentage of Black families in the typical Black family’s census tract; and similarly, the
Asian-Asian isolation index. To measure ethnic segregation, I use the Hispanic-Hispanic
isolation index. These measures are dependent on the evenness capture the degree to
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which racial and ethnic minorities are able or interested in living in racially and ethnically
diverse census tracts.
Finally, I also include a series of controls drawn from the 2000 Census. These include
two housing market metrics: the owner occupancy rate and the average age of housing.
The first measure captures the affordability and accessibility of housing in each region.
The average age of housing captures the quality of housing stock and the age of city. I
include two measures of MSA compactness, population density and average commute
times. Population density is intended as a rough measure of land costs and the supply
elasticity of housing in a city, and the degree to which urban areas have the geographic
and legal frameworks to build new housing. Commute times are better adapted to
capturing how housing is supplied in polycentric cities (Park & Quercia, 2015).
Transportation costs are a major factor in home prices, and inclusion helps capture how
well a city supplies homes close to jobs. All MSAs are measured using Census 2000
boundaries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Gini Housing Wealth Inequality 0.53 0.08 0.36 0.87 Author Calculated, 2005
Income Segregation
(H, 90th Pctile) 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.29
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000
Income Inequality (Gini) 0.44 0.03 0.36 0.54 ACS 2006
Black-Black Exposure Rate 26.63 20.88 0.38 71.37
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000
Hispanic-Hispanic Exposure Rate 14.55 16.78 0.66 89.45
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000




(minutes) 22.55 2.89 16.29 33.00 Census 2000
Population Density
(ppl per sq. mile) 273.96 222.33 18.06 1,552.53 Census 2000
Average Year Built
(years) 1970 7.85 1949 1989 Census 2000
Owner Occupancy Rate 0.68 0.05 0.52 0.84 Census 2000
Average Home Value ($) $106,217 $40,974 $42,800 $418,346 Census 2000
MSA Size 566,579 703,206 71,435 4,715,407 Census 2000
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Results
I calculate inequality metrics for all metropolitan and micropolitan areas nationwide in
2005. The overall Gini coefficient for urban housing wealth inequality in the United
States in 2000 is .54. This is considerably higher than income inequality, which falls
around .37 in this time period (Jenkins & Van Kerm, 2009). As shown in Table 1, in the
sample of 258 cities, average housing wealth inequality is almost exactly the national
average at .53, and varies widely from .36 to .87. The distribution of values is normal.
To investigate the relationship between housing wealth inequality and other forms of
inequality, I calculate correlations between MSA-level housing wealth inequality with a
variety of demographic measures and measures of income and racial segregation. In
Table 2 I show bivariate correlations between housing wealth inequality and several
measures of income segregation. Correlations between housing wealth inequality (HWI)
and measures of income sorting vary. The overall measures of income sorting,
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, also called the entropy or information theory index (H),
show a weak relationship with HWI. Sorting of the 10th percentile and at the 90th
percentile have weak relationships with higher HWI.
Table 2: Income Sorting and Housing Wealth Inequality
258 MSAs




Overall segregation (H) 0.04
Segregation of the poor (H10) 0.10
Segregation of the wealthy (H90) 0.06
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Source: US2010 Diversity and Disparities Project, Brown University
Next, I examine how housing wealth inequality varies with racial segregation. It’s
important to first note that housing wealth inequality at the MSA level varies with racial
composition. As shown in Table 3, urban regions that are predominantly White; and
those that have larger Black populations tend to have higher housing wealth inequality.
MSAs with higher Asian and Hispanic populations, have lower housing wealth
inequality. This may be because of differences in social factors driving segregation; in
differences in income between different minority demographic groups, or because of
geography. Figure 4 shows the distribution of racial minorities in 2015.
Figure 4: Largest Minority Group by County, 2015.
Source: 2015 American Community Survey 1 Year Estimates, Author’s Calculations
38
Racial and ethnic minorities cluster in states and regions that also have unique housing
market dynamics. In 2015 as shown in Figure 4, Black Americans were the primary
minority group in the Southeast; Hispanics were the predominant minority in
metropolitan areas in the Pacific states and states in the Southwest. The results in Table 3
suggest it will be important to disambiguate between region, size of minority population,
and minority segregation patterns in understanding the relationship between racial
segregation and housing wealth inequality.
Table 3: Correlations between Racial Composition of MSA and HWI





Percent Other Race -0.21
Table 4 shows bivariate correlations between racial segregation and housing wealth
inequality. Like Table 3 above, metrics of Hispanic and Asian segregation are correlated
with lower housing wealth inequality; measures of White and Black segregation are
correlated with higher housing wealth inequality. Dissimilarity and exposure indices are
dependent on the relative size of different populations. The exposure index is less reliant
on the size of the minority population in a given region. Examining the exposure of
Whites to Whites, and the exposure of Blacks to Blacks, these are both strong, positive
correlations.
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Table 4: Bivariate Correlations: Racial Segregation and Housing Wealth Inequality
Isolation of Whites 0.15 White-Black Dissimilarity 0.31
Isolation of Blacks 0.37 White-Hispanic Dissimilarity -0.04
Isolation of Hispanics -0.25 White-Asian Dissimilarity 0.19
Isolation of Asians -0.41 Black-White Dissimilarity 0.31
White-Black Exposure 0.26 Black-Hispanic Dissimilarity 0.28
White-Hispanic Exposure -0.21 Black-Asian Dissimilarity 0.39
White-Asian Exposure -0.47 Hispanic-White Dissimilarity -0.04
Black-White Exposure -0.14 Hispanic-Black Dissimilarity 0.28
Black-Hispanic Exposure -0.23 Hispanic-Asian Dissimilarity 0.12
Black-Asian Exposure -0.47 Asian-White Dissimilarity 0.19
Hispanic-White Exposure 0.13 Asian-Black Dissimilarity 0.39





To unpack the question of how income sorting and income inequality affect housing
wealth inequality at the regional level, I perform a series of incremental regressions using
robust standard errors in Table 5.
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Table 5: Regression Results
N: 258 MSAs
Predicted: MSA Level Gini of
Housing Wealth Inequality, 2005 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income Segregation of Wealth
(H, 90th Pctile)
0.18*** 0.13 0.13** 0.14** 0.13**
0.01 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.05
Income Inequality
(Gini)
0.09 0.03 0.08 0.04
0.21 0.61 0.20 0.56
Black-Black Exposure Rate 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.22***
0.00 0.00 0.00
Hispanic-Hispanic Exposure Rate -0.11** 0.00 0.05
0.05 0.99 0.35
Asian-Asian Exposure Rate -0.35*** -0.09 -0.09
0.00 0.11 0.09
Average Commute Time -0.33*** -0.24***
0.00 0.00
Population Density -0.11** -0.13**
0.04 0.02
Average Year Built -0.12** -0.26***
0.04 0.00
Owner Occupancy Rate 0.28*** 0.18***
0.00 0.00
Average Home Value -0.15** -0.06
0.02 0.30
MSA Size X X X X X
Census Division Fixed Effects X
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.50 0.55
Table 5 shows an incremental regression results and p-values. The beta coefficients in the
top row are standardized, indicating the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the
dependent variable. So, for instance, in model (1), a one standard deviation increase in
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income segregation corresponds to a .18 standard deviation increase in housing wealth
inequality. The second row contains the p-value.
A one standard deviation increase in segregation of the wealthy increases housing wealth
by .13 standard deviations in most specifications. This coefficient is stable when other
variables are included. Income inequality has a positive but small effect on housing
wealth inequality, with standardized coefficients ranging between .01 and .05 in the five
models.
The inclusion of measures of racial segregation increased the r-squared from .03 to .30,
suggesting that these spatial divisions explain far more of the variation in housing wealth
inequality than measures of income inequality and sorting alone. Measures of the
isolation of Blacks has the strongest relationship with housing wealth inequality,
increasing housing wealth inequality by .22 standard deviations in the full model. The
isolation of Asians and Hispanics has a negative coefficient when first introduced, but
this impact may be because racial segregation is proxying for the characteristics of
regions like California cities where Asian and Hispanic populations are highest. When
housing and regional characteristics are included, these effects disappear. The 5th model
includes census division fixed effects, absorbing the average impact of each census
division, and providing estimates that evaluate the impact of the variables within
divisions.
Conclusions
Though spatial variation in home prices and mortgage lending have been systematically
and thoroughly studied, this is the first attempt to systematically evaluate housing wealth
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inequality by urban region. Much work on home equity has focused on individual
decisions about timing, mortgage quality, and neighborhood choice. This research takes a
systemic view, finding that regional residential patterns are strong drivers of housing
wealth. Strong variation in housing wealth inequality between cities validates this
approach: there is something about regional housing dynamics that structures the
opportunity for homeowners to accumulate wealth through housing. As a low risk
leveraged investment, through mechanisms of forced savings and the ability to transform
sweat equity into home equity, housing offers a pathway to the middle class and for many
American households, the only opportunity to accumulate wealth. However, this
opportunity not only varies with demographics, but by city. Wealth inequality not only
varies substantially by MSA, but is highly correlated with residential patterns of income,
and particularly racial segregation – even without taking into account the vicissitudes of
the foreclosure crisis and the uneven recovery on housing wealth.
Contrary to theories that income must be the strongest driver of housing dynamics,
income inequality was not strongly related to housing wealth inequality in bivariate
correlations, nor in any specifications of the regression model. These results demonstrate
that, in this time frame, various forms of spatial segregation have a far stronger impact
than income inequality on housing wealth inequality. This research uses granular
measures of segregation, that measure concentration at the census tract level. Without a
measure of jurisdictional segregation, this analysis cannot clarify which mechanisms are
responsible for the relationship between housing wealth inequality and segregation. For
instance, some mechanisms of granular sorting include proximity to amenities like parks
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or public transportation hubs; or self-sorting into communities of preference as
individuals choose to buy homes near others who are similar to them in race, family
status, and income. Jurisdictional-level segregation can be the result of home price
discontinuities where public goods are gated by jurisdiction. This could be due to strong
differences in school quality, differing tax rates between counties and municipalities, or
exclusionary zoning (Lens & Monkkonen, 2016).
In 2000, in regions where the wealthy clustered in enclaves, housing wealth inequality is
higher. The segregation of wealth was shown to have a moderate, positive impact on
housing wealth inequality even when controlling for income inequality and other factors.
This suggests that housing wealth inequality responds strongly to residential patterns, and
forces like exclusionary zoning, jurisdictional fragmentation, and self-sorting. Whether
this is related to jurisdiction level sorting or the more granular sorting caused by
distributed self-selection that increasingly characterizes our era is beyond the scope of
this analysis.
Racial segregation was a strong predictor of housing wealth inequality, even after
controlling for income inequality and income segregation. The isolation of Blacks is
associated with far higher housing wealth inequality. These results come prior to the
housing market crash and foreclosure crisis, and are measured during the peak of the
bubble, when subprime lending and loose credit was at its highest. In 2005, Black
homeownership was still at record levels. At this time, predominantly Black
communities had been experiencing predatory lending and high foreclosure rates for a
decade, but the vicissitudes of the subprime mortgage crisis were not yet realized.
44
There was no confirmed relationship between housing wealth inequality and Hispanic
residential isolation. I checked whether this was related to the regional concentration of
Hispanics in the Pacific and Southwest regions. I tested the regression in Table 5 by
census division, and then in a limited sample of cities where Hispanics are greater than
10% of the population. However, Hispanic isolation was not significant in these
regressions either. This is similar to analyses of negative equity and Hispanic race; when
controls and regional fixed effects were added, there was no relationship between high
concentrations of Hispanic populations and negative equity (Raymond, 2016). It is
possible that Hispanics tend to live in cities that had low housing wealth inequality in
2005; but the results also suggest that non-Black racial and ethnic segregation is less
detrimental to housing wealth accumulation than Black racial segregation.
Lens and Monkkonen (2016) found that local pressure to regulate land uses results in
increasing segregation of affluence. In this research, we find an important consequence of
the isolation of affluence: even more than income inequality, income segregation drives
widening wealth inequality. Segregation by race has a similar, and even stronger impact.
This research underscores the importance of equitable and fair zoning policy at the local
level.
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Chapter 3: Racial Segregation, the Subprime an Foreclosure Crises,
and Urban Housing Wealth Inequality During the Crash (2005-2015)
Introduction
The period from 2005 to 2015 saw steep increases in housing wealth inequality. The
Black-White housing wealth gap widened drastically, with Black housing wealth
substantially depressed relative to the early 2000s. It is well documented that subprime
lending was targeted at predominantly Black communities and that the problem of
clustered foreclosures, persistent negative equity, and sluggish home price recovery was
disproportionately an issue in majority Black neighborhoods (Reid, Bocian, Li, &
Quercia, 2016). Nonetheless, analysis in the prior section confirms that housing wealth
inequality was an issue even during the previous era. In this section I evaluate the change
in MSA level housing wealth inequality and see whether changes are attributed to racial
segregation or other causes. In particular, I ask whether subprime lending and the
associated fallout accounts for most or all of the association between Black segregation
and rising housing wealth inequality.
Literature Review: Mortgage Debt and the Impact of Mortgage Markets
A key determinant of housing wealth accumulation is mortgage finance. The cost of
mortgage finance and the amortization schedule directly affects the ability of
homeowners to acquire home equity. Additionally, the riskiness of mortgage finance
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affects the ability of homeowners to weather economic downturns, and sell their homes at
a time which will allow them to maximize capital gains, rather than at the low point of
the market. Finally, mortgages have been found to be strong determinants of home prices.
Mortgage market imperfections can increase or reduce home prices and can amplify
sorting and segregation.
Mahoney and Thelen (2010) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) describe institutional change
as a process which can occur through layering. The institutional landscape of mortgage
lending changed dramatically in the 1990s in ways which interacted with urban
landscapes of segregation. Mortgage finance has historically operated to exacerbate
existing social divides. The post-war programs put into place to support mortgage
markets engaged in race-based geographic discrimination called redlining. Under this
practice, government agencies marked out urban neighborhoods with high concentrations
of minorities as high risk. These areas were denied mortgage finance for renovations or
home purchase, thereby pushing urban, minority communities to seek higher risk finance,
or to forgo homeownership or improvements altogether. In the 1990s and 2000s, many of
these neighborhoods were targeted with high concentrations of predatory loans
(Immergluck, 2011; Rugh et al., 2015; Rugh & Massey, 2010).
The lack of formal relationships with traditional mortgage lenders has been documented
as one reason why minority borrowers were receptive to subprime lenders in the 1990s
and 2000s, with some authors emphasizing a lack of familiarity or existing networks and
experience to integrate borrowers with trustworthy borrowers (Williams, Nesiba, &
McConnell, 2005). Others blame credit segmentation and risk-based pricing itself,
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arguing that in an era of restricted market areas and standardized products, banks cross-
subsidized loans, reducing the tendency of loan terms to amplify existing inequalities in
wealth. In the era of risk-based pricing and geographical deregulation, these pressures
were reduced (G. A. Dymski, 2009). Squires et al. (2009) believe that segregation and
subprime lending are connected through four pathways. The first is that historic exclusion
from traditional prime mortgage markets created concentrated demand for mortgage
products.  The second is related to the idea that informed financial decision making may
be transmitted through social networks. Segregated minority communities may be less
experienced financial consumers. Third, lenders may market heavily in high minority
areas, a strategy dubbed “reverse redlining.” Fourth, though subprime mortgages were
offered to many borrowers who were qualified for a prime loan, subprime products were
targeted at higher risk borrowers. Because segregation is associated with economic
distress, it is possible that highly segregated cities have higher numbers of high risk
borrowers to begin with.
These different pathways correspond to different types or spatial patterns of segregation.
Financial exclusion can sometimes be related to the distribution of financial institutions
in a given area. Social network and “reverse redlining” phenomena should be related to
large areas with high minorities, those typically measured by an isolation index, or
perhaps related to the patterns of segregation seen in the “group threat” or jurisdictional
forms of segregation. The fourth relationship suggests that subprime lending is related to
income sorting which may underlie racial segregation, suggesting that once one controls
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for economic characteristics like income and creditworthiness, the association between
racial segregation and high cost mortgages should disappear.
In general, the idea that income and creditworthiness alone can explain why minorities
disproportionately received subprime loans has been discredited. Multiple individual-
level studies with rich data on borrower income and creditworthiness have been
performed which demonstrate that race was a significant predictor of more expensive
loans, even after controlling for relevant loan and borrower characteristics (Bocian, Ernst,
& Li, 2008; M. M. Smith & Hevener, 2014). Other research has established the
relationship between subprime lending and segregated neighborhoods. Rugh and Massey
(2010) find that segregated, minority neighborhoods were the disproportionate recipients
of high risk loans. They note that while Black-White segregation has declined in cities
with small Black populations, hyper-segregation or segregation which is high across
multiple measures has remained high in cities with large Black minorities. In a regression
controlling for a variety of credit and economic factors, they find that the degree of
Hispanic and minority segregation is the strongest predictor of foreclosure. They confirm
the role of racialized lending in a two-stage least squares regression which instruments
for segregation using the Black-White gap in subprime lending. This study draws a tight
link between high risk lending targeted at hyper-segregated minorities and foreclosures.
Similarly, Rugh et al. (2015) studies the relationship between predatory lending and
segregation in the hyper-segregated city of Baltimore. Their analysis confirms that
subprime lending increased with income among Blacks, and decreased with income
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among Whites. This suggests that income sorting will not have as strong relationship with
subprime lending as racial segregation.
The dynamics of mortgage lending during the 2000s probably increased inequality in
housing equity in hyper-segregated regions by saddling Black homeowners with higher
debt levels and lower ability to build equity (Rugh et al., 2015). Mortgages may also have
increased inequality through their impact on home prices (Levitin & Wachter, 2012,
2013; A. R. Mian & Sufi, 2009). Because so many high risk loans created local housing
bubbles ending in crashes and foreclosures, that as the foreclosure crisis progressed,
neighborhoods with long periods of vacancy exhibited the cumulative effect of multiple
downward pressures (Harding, Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Immergluck & Smith, 2006).
Vacant homes have a well-researched negative effect on neighboring home prices during
this crisis (Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, 2011). In addition, in many of these neighborhoods,
low income homeowners may have been the wealthier residents. When foreclosures
forced them to leave, they left more highly concentrated poverty behind. Under these
circumstances, the disposition of vacant homes becomes very important for alleviating
poverty, creating mixed income neighborhoods, and reducing crime.
There are a variety of studies which cover national trends in housing wealth inequality
leading up to the 1990s (Flippen, 2004; Oliver & Shapiro, 2006) and through the
subprime and foreclosure crises (Shapiro et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2011) but few which
examine this phenomenon at a local scale. Krivo and Kaufman (2004) examine the
unique processes which drive inequality in housing wealth between socioeconomic
groups, and include some regional measures. They examine housing wealth accumulation
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using the 2001 American Housing Survey data (AHS) and a rich household-level of
covariates. In a set of models predicting home equity by race/ethnicity, they find that
higher levels of Black-White segregation are associated with higher home equity for
Blacks. Living in the South and West predicted higher levels of equity for most groups;
living in the central city was negatively associated with home equity for all groups. Prior
homeownership and down payment size were key determinants of home equity for
Whites and Asians, but not for Blacks and Hispanics. Many theories of the relationship
between home prices and segregation describe how demand or supply constraints are the
mechanism by which unevenness occurs. However, when Krivo and Kaufman (2004)
estimate the impact of metropolitan level starts and home prices on home equity for
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics and Asians, they find no significant impact of starts on equity,
but home price level has a strong impact on equity by race.
One study that tries to examine wealth inequality in a spatial context (Foster & Kleit,
2014) addresses this question of what drives wealth inequality with three (1990, 2000,
2010) decade-lag, county-level regressions. This study evaluates the impact of mortgage
type on wealth inequality. The main weakness of the study is that they cannot measure
wealth inequality directly and instead use a proxy, income inequality, as their dependent
variable. Their findings – similar to Lee (2013) – are that subprime lending in some time
periods and local contexts reduced income inequality, though in other time periods and
contexts, it increased inequality. For example, subprime lending temporarily lowered
racial and income segregation during the bubble, but exacerbated segregation trends
during the crash and recession. Foster and Kleit (2014) suggest that housing had an
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equalizing effect until the 2000s and that subprime lending had mixed impacts on wealth
inequality. One weakness of their study is that they estimate inequality at the county
level, which can alternatively be interpreted as a measure of integration. This suggests
that subprime lending may have reduced segregation at the county level.
Another recently released study most relevant to the goals of this research is Underwater
America, released by the Haas Institute (Dreier, Bhatti, Call, Schwartz, & Squires, 2014).
In a cross-sectional study of underwater housing using primarily simple descriptive
statistics, they find that underwater homes are extremely concentrated in a handful of
cities, and within those cities, in a few zip codes. They found indications of strong
correlations between negative equity, low income, and minority status, suggesting that
segregation is strongly correlated with the uneven housing market recovery and the loss
of, or lack of wealth accumulation of some households.  Using the same dataset, Zillow
issued a 2014 brief on housing wealth inequality, using the Gini index calculated at the
county level (Hubbard, 2014). Again, in cities with small counties, this might be a better
measure of integration than housing inequality. They find that housing wealth inequality
is highest along the coasts. They split housing equity into quintiles, and estimate the
contribution to the Gini index measured at four spatial scales: city, county, MSA and
state. They found that the low and high ends of the spectrum contribute strongly to
housing wealth inequality. Raymond (2016) uses this same dataset to predict negative
equity in the Southeast and finds that predominantly Black neighborhoods have far higher
rates of concentrated negative equity.  This was true even after controlling for an array of
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economic and housing market indicators, as well as mortgage market indicators like
subprime lending and the density of foreclosures.
The key assumption I wish to test in this chapter is that housing wealth inequality relates
to racial and income segregation significantly through mortgage practices like risk-based
pricing and subprime lending. High risk lending in racially segregated areas, the
subprime and foreclosure crises, and uneven response, are key drivers of widening
inequality (G. A. Dymski & Veitch, 1996; Immergluck, 2011). In the post-crisis era,
tightening credit and risk-based pricing amplify income sorting or segregation between
and within cities and generate increasing returns to income/wealth through regressively
pricing of mortgage debt.
Figure 5 depicts in blue the relationship between forms of income sorting and racial
segregation, and housing wealth inequality. In an analysis testing the relationship
between the variables of interest, and the outcome variable, housing wealth inequality,
there are other variables which can be included to reduce variation or control for
alternative explanations. First, there are variations in housing quality and variation in
location quality, depicted in yellow. Second, the institutional framework of mortgage
markets, shaded in red, vary from city to city and has been found to govern the local
intensity of subprime lending.
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Figure 5: Conceptual Map
There are several complications attending to an investigation of the relationship between
segregation and housing wealth. First, mortgage lending is often cited as a contributing
factor to segregation, whileanother strain of research suggests that segregation lead to
predatory lending in the 1990s and 2000s. This suggests the relationship between
mortgage debt and segregation has endogeneity, at least over the long term. Second,
theory suggests the relationship between segregation and home prices is not monotonic –
segregation can cause home prices to increase or decrease, depending on the presence of
supply constraints like exclusionary zoning. Third, the degree to which preferences are
heterogeneous or homogenous, and the degree to which preferences are capitalized into
price or whether a sorting equilibrium is reached mediates the impact of income sorting
on home prices. That is, income sorting has been theorized to increase home price
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inequality by some, and to decrease it by others. Fourth, the geographic scale of
segregation is a key aspect of measurement.Capturing segregation at the appropriate
spatial scale will be technically difficult but key to results.
Methods and Data
Methods
In this chapter I seek to understand how the subprime mortgage crisis affected regional
housing wealth inequality between 2005 and 2015, and whether it provides a stronger
explanation for increases in housing wealth inequality than other relevant factors.
Question 3: Is mortgage lending a significant mechanism by which racial segregation
impacts housing wealth inequality?
H3: Housing Wealth Inequality is higher in the presence of racial segregation, primarily
through the mechanism of subprime lending which resulted in long-term depression in
home prices and higher mortgage prices in hyper-segregated areas.
The previous two sections investigated relationships between housing wealth and racial
segregation and sorting suggested by the literature on home price dynamics. This section
examines the contribution of mortgage markets in the contemporary housing markets. In
order to see whether subprime lending is the mechanism by which segregation influences
housing wealth inequality, I will add measures of mortgage lending to the equation, using
data from before and after the housing market crisis. Because of the association, I expect
here that the inclusion of factors related to the housing crisis will deflate the measures of
racial segregation, particularly measures of Black isolation.
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(1) Change in Housing Wealth Inequalityi = α + β1 Change in Income Inequalityi+ β 2
Change in Income Segregationi+ β 3 Change in Racial Segregationi + β 5Subprime
Loan Share 2005i + β6Post-Crisis Vacanciesi2012 + β7Change in Age of Housing
Stocki + β8Change in Owner Occupancy Ratei + β9Change in Commute Timesi +
β10Change in Population Densityi + εi
The main challenge to validity here is that racial minorities tend to live in regions with
particular urban characteristics, and the size of a minority community tends to be
mechanically positively correlated with measures of segregation. For example, Hispanic
populations are clustered in Southern California, and the Southwest: cities which tend to
be sprawling and have low density. Cities with the largest Black populations are found
throughout the Southeast, in cities which tend to be even more sprawling than those to the
West. Urban processes affected the trajectory of the recovery in many cities. Included in
the model are two measures of housing market, the age of housing stock and owner
occupancy rate; and two measures of compactness, population density and commute
times. In order to measure the impact of segregation and sorting on housing wealth
inequality, I use a first differences approach, estimating the impact of change in income
sorting, income inequality, and racial segregation, among other variables. The only
variables which are not expressed as change scores are the variables of interest, subprime
lending, and post-crisis vacancies.
Data
I use the same 258 MSAs as in the analysis in Chapter 2 for continuity of results. In this
analysis, I calculate the change in Housing Wealth Inequality between 2005 and 2015. I
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also calculate changes in factors included in the analysis in Chapter 1: income sorting,
income inequality, racial segregation, housing market and measures of regional
compactness. I then include two measures of the subprime and foreclosure crisis: the
percentage of all mortgages that were subprime in 2005, and the percentage of vacant
homes in 2012.
Housing wealth is again calculated using CRISM’s credit records and mortgage
administrative records for 2015. Using data on the date, price and location of the initial
home sale, I estimate current market value using Corelogic’s home price indices. I then
calculate Gini coefficients for each metropolitan and micropolitan area in 2015, and
subtract from that each city’s Gini coefficient for 2005. A weakness in this metric stems
from the limitation that this data can only be used to calculate housing wealth inequality
among mortgaged homeowners. This means if over time, in one city, distressed
homeowners tended to exit homeownership either through foreclosure or home sales; and
in another, distressed homeowners held onto their homes but remained in negative equity,
all else equal, the second city would have a higher housing wealth inequality. Since we
know that between 2005 and 2015, as many as 5% of households exited homeownership,
this dynamic could be important.
Measures of income and racial segregation are drawn from the Diversity and Disparities
project, 2000-2012. Other measures, including those capturing income inequality,
housing market and regional compactness are drawn from the 2000 Census and 2012
American Community Survey.
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To estimate the magnitude of subprime lending, I calculate the percentage of subprime
loans using 2005 HMDA data. The year 2005 is chosen because it was near the peak for
the issuance of subprime loans, and because underwriting was particularly poor in this
year and led to high rates of subsequent default. From 2004 onwards, HMDA required
reporters to report the annual percentage rate (APR) for all loans in which the rate spread
between the loan and a comparable maturity treasury security was higher than
benchmark. For primary mortgages, that benchmark was 3%. For second liens, it was 5%.
These loans meet the definition put out by the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau of
subprime or higher-priced loans. This is the definition I used to identify the percentage of
mortgage originations that were subprime in 2005.
There were multiple channels by which the foreclosure crisis depressed home prices and
created uneven home price appreciation in a city. Distressed sales tended to depress local
home prices when they were included as comparable by appraisers for non-distressed
sales. The period of deterioration leading up to a foreclosure tended to depress nearby
home prices. One of the most deleterious effects of the foreclosure crisis for home prices
was prolonged vacancies in bank-owned or investor owned homes. To measure the
prevalence of these properties, I use the ACS measure of other vacant homes that are not
for sale or rent in 2012.
Again, as in Chapter 2, I include measures of housing market, owner occupancy rate and
average age of housing and measures of regional compactness, population density and
commute times. Summary statistics for all variables are found in Table 6.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics
Observations: 258 MSAs Mean Std. Dev Min Max Source
Housing Wealth Inequality 0.11 0.19 -0.21 1.12 Author Calculated, 2005-2015
Change in Isolation of Wealth 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.08
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000-ACS 2012
Change in Income Inequality 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.06 ACS 2006-ACS2012
Change in Black-Black Exposure Rate -3.32 3.14 -13.82 13.75
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Hispanic-Hispanic Exposure Rate 4.02 2.44 -2.72 10.92
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Asian-Asian Exposure Rate 1.98 1.74 -4.71 15.00
Diversity & Disparities;
Census 2000-ACS2012
Percent of loans subprime in 2005 0.26 0.05 0.11 0.48 Census 2000-ACS2012
Vacant Homes, 2012 7.10 4.43 2.26 53.17 Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Commute Times 0.43 1.87 -4.06 10.71 Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Population Density 21.99 129.28 -510.01 276.44 Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Year Built 6.05 3.76 -2.96 25.49 Census 2000-ACS2012
Change in Owner Occupancy Rate 66.27 5.03 52.24 80.03 Census 2000-ACS2012
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Results
Housing wealth rose dramatically over the 10-year period between 2005 and the 2015.
From the peak of the housing crisis through to 2015, among all US metro and
micropolitan areas, housing wealth inequality rose by .12, from .54 in 2005 to .68 in
2015. In the 258 MSA sample, the housing wealth Gini coefficient rose by an average of
.11. By contrast, income inequality only rose by .01. While housing wealth inequality
increased across the board, some cities saw declines in housing wealth inequality, but
others saw extremely strong increases. Because of high levels of negative equity, some
Gini coefficients in the 2015 period are higher than 1, and in one case rose by 1.12 over
the decade (Jenkins, 2005).
In Figure 6, I have broken out the change in housing wealth inequality by region. In this
chart, we see that the Pacific and Mountain regions went from having the lowest housing
wealth inequality to the highest housing wealth inequality in the nation. The Northeast
also rose from the bottom to the middle of the pack.
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Figure 6: Change in Housing Wealth Inequality by Region, 2005-2015
Housing markets in census regions can share characteristics like a low housing supply
elasticity, or high Hispanic population, which do not change substantially over a 10-year
period. Many of the factors thought to influence home prices do not change at the rate
which housing wealth inequality shifted over the last 15 years. In a cross sectional
regression, this could increase the risk of omitting relevant variables. Using a first
differences approach to understand the impact of social factors on the change in housing
wealth helps to ensure that any detected correlation between high housing wealth


































In Table 7, I display the results for the regression. Sometimes a first-differences approach
eliminates too much variance to have explanatory power, but in this model the r-squared
value is .29; the model explains one third of the variance. The VIFs for all variables were
below 2. The leftmost column displays standardized or beta coefficients; as before, they
show how a one standard deviation increase in the variable impacts the dependent
variable. So, a one standard deviation increase in income inequality is associate with a
.19 standard deviation increase in housing wealth inequality. Variables in blue are
significant at the .05 level.
Changes in the isolation of the wealthy were not strongly associated with housing wealth
inequality. This counters other research at the zip code level that suggests that housing
wealth inequality is driven primarily from price increases at the high end (Hubbard,
2014).
However, changes in income inequality and changes in racial and ethnic segregation were
strong and significant. Income inequality increased slightly over the 12-year period, and
had a strong and significant association with higher housing wealth inequality. On
average, Black isolation declined by 3%, while Hispanic isolation rose by 4%. Both
factors were positively associated with strong increases in housing wealth inequality at
the regional level. Average change in Asian residential isolation was lower, at 2%, and
this change was not significantly related to housing wealth inequality in the model.
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Table 7: Regression Results
Obs 258                                                                                                             R squared: .30
Predicted: Change in Housing
Wealth Inequality, 2005-2015 Coefficient
Standard
Error t P>t Beta
Change in Isolation of Wealth 1.49 1.01 1.48 0.14 0.09
Change in Income Inequality 2.08*** 0.74 2.83 0.01 0.19***
Change in Black-Black Exposure
Rate 0.01*** 0.00 2.58 0.01 0.17***
Change in Hispanic-Hispanic
Exposure Rate 0.02*** 0.01 2.53 0.01 0.21***
Change in Asian-Asian Exposure
Rate 0.02* 0.01 1.84 0.07 0.17
Percent of loan originations that are
subprime in 2005 0.65** 0.29 2.26 0.03 0.17**
Vacant Homes, 2012 0.01*** 0.00 2.48 0.01 0.19***
Change in Commute Times 0.01 0.01 1.41 0.16 0.10
Change in Population Density (0.00) 0.00 (0.72) 0.47 (0.07)
Change in Year Built 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.50 0.05
Change in Owner Occupancy Rate (0.01)*** 0.00 (3.09) 0.00 (0.26)***
Constant 0.43 0.21 2.08 0.04
Subprime lending in 2005 varied from 11% to nearly half of all mortgage originations for
some metropolitan areas. This factor and long-term vacancies were both large and
significant predictors of housing wealth inequality. Additionally, the change in the
owner-occupancy rate can be thought to be a third measure of the foreclosure crisis. From
2005 to 2015, nearly 6% of households exited homeownership as the homeownership rate
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fell from its all-time high of 69% to a 50-year low of 63%. In this model, declines in
homeownership correspond with a .05 increase in housing wealth inequality Gini. I did
test models with foreclosure rate as an independent variable and the standardized
coefficients were extremely high, approaching 1. However, foreclosure was highly
collinear with both subprime lending and vacancies. For this reason and because the
foreclosure dataset matched with just under 100 MSAs, cutting the sample by more than
half, I used other metrics instead.
In a model without these three measures of the financial crisis - subprime lending,
vacancies, and homeownership declines - coefficients for Black and Hispanic isolation is
.17 and .27, respectively. The inclusion of these factors related to subprime lending in the
model had no impact on the explanatory of changes in Black segregation, but reduced
Hispanic segregation by a fifth. This contradicts my expectation prior to performing the
analysis, which was that housing wealth inequality increases associated with Black
segregation would be largely, if not completely, explained by the subprime crisis and
subsequent foreclosures and clustered. These findings suggest that in cities where racial
segregation increased through the downturn and recovery, wealth inequality increased
strongly. In cities with strengthening Hispanic segregation, this was directly related to the
subprime and foreclosure crisis. In cities with strengthening Black segregation, it is




This research confirms results found elsewhere that housing wealth inequality rose
swiftly between 2005 and 2015. Metropolitan areas in the Northeast, the Pacific, and
Mountain regions saw swifter increases in inequality than other regions.
As in the pre-crisis era analysis in Chapter 1, this analysis confirms that racial
segregation is strongly associated with metropolitan housing wealth inequality. Unlike
that analysis, changes in income inequality rather than changes in income segregation
were the more powerful driver of housing wealth inequality.
A second goal of this research was to understand if the effects of the foreclosure crisis
were the primary way in which racial segregation relates to housing wealth inequality in
the current era. This model evaluates the impact of changes in racial segregation over the
decade on changes in housing wealth inequality over the decade. However, measures of
subprime lending and vacancies did not completely deflate these coefficients; in the case
of Black residential isolation, the coefficient was largely unchanged by the introduction
of subprime lending to the model. Other research has established that subprime lending
was primarily targeted at predominantly Black communities. The finding in this model is
likely due to the way racial segregation was measured. High rates of Black residential
isolation have been connected to high rates of predatory mortgage lending, followed by
clustered foreclosures and vacancies that directly impact home equity. However,
expressed as a change score, metropolitan trends in racial isolation are probably
indirectly related to subprime lending through patterns of gentrification and
neighborhood change. While measuring the change in segregation allows for a stronger
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link to be made between measures of segregation and housing wealth inequality, it
weakens the tie between subprime lending and segregation.
The model in Chapter 2 showed relationships between housing market characteristics like
overall age of housing and owner-occupancy rate, and between measures of compactness
like population density and commute times. This regression finds no association between
a decade of change in housing market characteristics and increases or declines in housing
wealth inequality. The relationships between these factors may take longer than a decade
to evolve, or it is possible the housing crisis altered fundamental relationships that may
have characterized an earlier era. Similarly, there is no relationship between changes in
measures of compactness. Some research has suggested that cities with low price
elasticity of supply had more prolonged and uneven recoveries, as the overhang of
properties built during the bubble depressed home prices in the suburbs. This model does
not confirm those findings.
There is a growing body of research demonstrating the impact that the subprime and
foreclosure crises had on housing wealth of individuals, and in widening the wealth gap
between White, Black and Hispanic homeowners. This chapter examines how dynamic
changes during the crisis and recovery period may have structured outcomes for
homeowners in those regions. The housing crisis of the late 2000s was a period of
massive and rapid change in housing markets, policy implementation, and institutional
framework for mortgage markets. This analysis evaluates the impact metropolitan level
changes had on the evolution of housing wealth inequality over a 15-year period. In the
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next section, I examine the impact of segregation and mortgage lending on housing
wealth inequality in a series of individual level models.
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Chapter 4: Risk-Based Mortgage Lending, Income Segregation, and
Urban Housing Wealth Inequality During the Recovery (2010-2015)
Introduction
Mortgage terms and availability are a key determinant of a homeowner’s ability to
accumulate home equity. Simultaneously, the cost of a mortgage, tax benefits, and tie
between balance sheet and the performance of the home as an asset is thought to increase
pressure on homeowners to self-sort into locations where prices are expected to rise. In
this chapter, I examine the impact of risk-based mortgage pricing and income sorting on
housing wealth inequality using individual-level data on home mortgage borrowers.
Mortgage market institutions have changed drastically over the past decades. The
infrastructure of mortgage markets has shifted away from public agencies subsidizing
affordable, low-risk mortgage products for homeowners, facilitating individual
homeownership. Mortgage markets have shifted towards private markets and segmented
products since the post-war creation of institutions to engender wide spread
homeownership. The institutions supporting individual homeowners have moved towards
supporting corporate lenders and mortgage markets (Aalbers, 2008; Immergluck, 2011;
Krippner, 2005; Levitin, 2013). In the current era, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain
under conservatorship following losses during the subprime and foreclosure crisis.
Management under conservatorship implemented many risk-based pricing policies. Most
recently, the Obama administration proposed privatizing the mortgage giants, and the
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Trump administration has made this even more likely. Scholars studying the
financialization of housing markets have focused particularly on the practice of risk-
based pricing as a factor which might amplify inequality (Aalbers, 2009).
Mortgage policy is not executed in a vacuum, but is implemented in the social space of
neighborhoods and real estate markets. There are some indications that, like racial
segregation, income segregation is highly correlated with rising housing inequality. At
the national level, housing wealth inequality has widened along class lines over the last
thirty years. In the current era, legalized racial segregation at the jurisdictional level is
declining, while decentralized income segregation is rising. Rising housing wealth
inequality could plausibly be caused by the changing bases of racial segregation, rising
income sorting, and the damage to housing wealth done by subprime lending.
However, little research has attempted to understand how urban patterns of segregation
and integration contribute to the dynamics that generate housing wealth, or to perform
multilevel analyses to understand how national trends interact with regional patterns to
produce inequality. Is homeownership a path to the middle class in some regions more so
than others? Do nationwide policies like risk-based mortgage pricing amplify housing
wealth inequality, and does that impact vary with income segregation? To answer these
questions, I construct a dataset to measure the distribution of housing wealth within urban
regions. With this dataset, I use spatial variation to analyze the relationship between
racial and income segregation and housing wealth inequality. In this research, I
investigate whether mortgage finance is a mechanism by which income based segregation
impacts housing wealth inequality.
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Literature Review
Income Segregation and Housing Wealth Inequality
This research examines the impact of income segregation on housing wealth inequality.
Income segregation is rising in the United States (Ellen, Horn, & O'Regan, 2012).
Watson (2009) finds that income sorting rose between 1970 and 1990, and has remained
at 1990 levels for two decades. Against a backdrop of stable or declining racial
segregation, other researchers have found rising isolation of poverty beginning in the
1970s, and in the 1980s onwards, rising isolation of wealth (Bischoff & Reardon, 2013;
Fry & Taylor, 2012; Watson, 2009). Income sorting declined during the period of general
affluence (and the rise of subprime lending) in the 1990s but rose again afterwards.
However, Fry and Taylor (2012) note that income sorting remains less prevalent than
racial segregation, and that segregation and sorting vary widely by city and region.
What is the cause of rising income sorting? One source may be a reduction of racial
segregation, permitting greater neighborhood choice for well-to-do racial minorities
(Bischoff & Reardon, 2013; Sharkey, 2013; Wilson, 2012). Another cause of increased
income sorting is rising income inequality. Watson (2009) uses an innovative metric to
measure income segregation and finds that income inequality almost completely explains
rises in income sorting from 1970-2000. Bischoff and Reardon (2013) find that income
inequality is highly correlated with the segregation of affluence, but not the segregation
of poverty.
The geographic scale of sorting and segregation lend clues as to the causes of income
sorting. Overall, contemporary income sorting does not follow a city vs. suburbs pattern.
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Instead, segregation became higher within city centers and within the suburbs. Watson
(2009) infers from this that income sorting may be driven by intensified competition for
very fine grained local amenities (like parks, proximity to retail, or neighborhood status),
but not public goods – like schools - provided at the local jurisdictional level.  Similarly,
Davidoff (2005) measures contemporary income sorting and attempts to differentiate
between Tiebout sorting which occurs at the local jurisdictional level, and fine-grained
amenity or Shelling-style sorting. Using 2000 census data on 279 metropolitan areas,
Davidoff measures the variance in income segregation within and between jurisdictions,
comparing zip codes on the borders of jurisdictions to control for variation in
neighborhood composition and amenities. Focusing on the Boston MSA, he finds that
jurisdictional boundaries account for only account for 2% of the variation in income,
again suggesting that contemporary sorting is occurring around something more spatially
fine grained than variation in taxation levels or school quality.
Another determinant of the rise of income sorting is density-based zoning. Watson (2009)
and Davidoff (2005) find that income sorting likely occurs at the sub-jurisdictional level
and is driven by income inequality, which they theorize to be evidence for amenity-based
sorting or shelling-style sorting. Contradicting the findings of Watson (2009) and
Davidoff (2005) is a set of research that finds that jurisdictional level factors are the
primary driver of contemporary segregation. Most recently, Lens and Monkkonen (2016)
study the relationship between density based zoning and income segregation in 95 cities
nationwide. They find that density restrictions imposed at the jurisdictional level are
powerful drivers of the segregation of affluence, but not the poor. State regulation is
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associated with the isolation of poverty. J. T. Rothwell and Massey (2010) find a strong
relationship between density zoning and income segregation in a study of US cities from
1990-2000, and with an instrumental variables approach, find this relationship is causal.
In an earlier article on the changing bases of segregation, Massey et al. (2009) note the
rise in segregation by income as well as class, as measured by educational attainment,
ideology, and employment sector.  Though the market allocates housing by price, in a
perfect housing market there would be complete income sorting, they attribute the rise in
income sorting not to the marketplace, but to density zoning.
How can we expect rising income segregation to affect housing wealth inequality? There
is a broad literature that relates housing wealth and income, and empirical research has
demonstrated that housing markets are often segmented by income and price, among
other factors, so that in certain time periods and cities, home prices rise in ways that
amplify existing economic inequality. Di and Liu (2007) and Krumm and Kelly (1989),
study wealth accumulation during the 19909s. They find that high income families
experience greater gains to homeownership than the low-income families in their sample.
In a study of matched purchase and sales data in four cities, Belsky and Duda (2002) find
that residential real estate at the bottom of the spectrum appreciates far faster than those
in the middle or higher end of the spectrum. McMillen (2008) looks into why the
percentage of expensive homes increased in Chicago between 1995 and 2005. He finds
that increasing demand, rather than changes in housing stock explain the change. Boehm
and Schlottmann (2008) also find that housing wealth increases with income. They
estimate a dynamic model of family wealth accumulation using PSID’s longitudinal data
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on household wealth from 1984-1992. They observe that housing appreciation is roughly
the same for their four socioeconomic groups, but even so, average annual housing
wealth accumulation increases with socioeconomic status.
It is possible for this sort of housing market segmentation to occur without segregation –
for instance, in integrated communities with mixed housing types and price levels.
However, segregation may amplify housing segmentation dynamics. Because there are
externalities to home prices, the degree of segregation may amplify the impact of income
inequality on real estate values. Additionally, because home prices incorporate the value
of local amenities, sorting and segregation may result in wide discrepancies in the local
endowment schools, access to jobs, public transportation, and other public goods, which
are then capitalized into price. The literature on income sorting is not always clear about
whether uneven home price movements documented are simply due to segmentation of
the market, or whether there are other forces such as externalities at play. At stake is
whether and how home price dynamics amplify or echo growing income inequality. If
home prices diverge because markets are segmented by income and incomes are
diverging, this suggests that housing wealth will not lead to increasing returns to income
inequality.
One way income segregation can generate inequality is if segregation lays the
groundwork for gentrification (Jacobs, 1961). Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Tobio (2012)
analyze within-city home price dynamics during the 2000s housing boom. They show
that, on average, places with centralized poverty had stronger price appreciation in the
city center than in the suburbs. In a series of zip code level regressions using MSA fixed
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effects from 1996-2006, they ask whether a supply elasticity or a gentrification model
best explains the pattern of home price appreciation during the boom, finding that a
gentrification model best explains these patterns.   In particular, they focus on the
importance of local public transportation infrastructure as a driver of gentrification. A
significant weakness of this study is that they do not evaluate the impact of subprime
lending as a potential cause of home price booms in areas with centralized poverty.
Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2013) investigate whether “endogenous gentrification”
generates within-city variation in home prices. They believe the distribution of home
values within an urban region is driven by the income distribution and income sorting.
They ask whether neighborhood home price growth relative to the MSA is linked with
income growth relative to the MSA; and whether poor neighborhoods are more likely to
gentrify when they neighbor rich neighborhoods. They find that home prices are strongly
tied to income growth, and that strong home price increases in places with affordable
home prices are much more likely in areas which neighbor high price areas. They
interpret this result to be the effect of Shelling-style sorting, with residents demonstrating
a preference for living adjacent to higher income neighborhoods. These two papers
present explanations for uneven recovery that are fundamentally different than the idea of
market segmentation, which relies heavily on the idea of segmented markets responding
to mismatched changes in demand and supply.
As fine grained income segregation rises, what impact will this have on housing wealth
inequality? In this research, I attempt to understand this connection, particularly as it
pertains to mortgage finance practices like risk-based pricing.
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Mortgage Finance and Housing Wealth Inequality
Several factors of mortgage finance impact the ability of borrowers to accumulate wealth.
The cost of mortgage finance and amortization schedule directly affects the ability of
homeowners to acquire home equity. Additionally, the riskiness of mortgage finance
affects the ability of homeowners to weather economic downturns, and sell their homes at
a time which will allow them to maximize capital gains, rather than at the low point of
the market. Finally, mortgages have been found to be strong determinants of home prices.
Mortgage market imperfections can have the impact of increasing or reducing home
prices and can amplify sorting and segregation.
In the post-recession era, credit tightness and the impact of risk-based pricing policies
may have the effect of amplifying housing wealth inequality. In the aftermath of the
crisis, the GSEs instituted loan level pricing for insurance fees, and private sector
mortgage securitizers have added overlays in response to concerns of having to
repurchase loans which are found retrospectively to not conform to GSE standards
(Immergluck, 2015a; Wachter, 2015). Past researchers have observed that credit sorting
and an increase in the cost of mortgage debt and the returns to creditworthiness should
increase credit sorting (Hanson, Schnier, & Turnbull, 2012; Walks, 2014). Wachter
(2015) describes two ways in which credit tightness and risk-based pricing may
exacerbate geographic inequality. First, if lenders price risk in response to geographically
specific income shocks, this will amplify inequality. Pavlov, Wachter, and Zevelev
(2014) model this phenomenon between two cities, but presumably it could occur
between two neighborhoods within a city as well. Second, housing affordability has
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declined, and at the same time, sorting between metropolitan areas has increased, with
low skilled workers sorting into lower tier cities and high skilled workers sorting into
high tiered cities. Under these conditions, risk-based pricing may work to amplify the
tenure gap in highly desirable cities.
A final way in which mortgage credit can translate into housing wealth is by repairing
nearby home prices. Recent evaluations of the Home Affordable Refinance Program
(HARP) and of Quantitative Easing (QE) are relevant here. HARP was released on 2009
as a response to the financial crisis and sought to allow distressed homeowners refinance
at historically low rates and lower their mortgage payments. The program was tweaked
over the course of several years, with loan to value and credit score criteria slowly
relaxed, and ultimately reached 3.4 million borrowers. QE is a monetary policy by which
the central bank purchased US treasuries and other financial assets to meet a range of
goals. In the second and third rounds of quantitative easing, the US central bank
purchased over a trillion dollars of mortgage backed securities. This had the impact of
increasing investor demand for mortgages, and lowering mortgage rates in the primary
mortgage market, which prompted a boom in mortgage refinances. Both HARP and the
second and third rounds of QE lowered mortgage pricing; and research into these
programs has found that borrower savings translate into faster local home price
appreciation. In the case of HARP, researchers find that reduced mortgage pricing
significantly reduced the probability of foreclosure for many borrowers, improved home
prices, and helped boost consumption and the local economy. Zhu et al (2015) find that a
10% reduction in mortgage payment corresponded to a 10% reduction in the default risk
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for borrowers. Agarwal et al. (2015) measure the degree to which mortgage savings
passed through to local economies. They find that regions with more HARP refinances
corresponded with more durable spending, reduced foreclosure rates, and faster home
price appreciation. In similar research on the effect of QE on home prices, Beraja et al.
(2015) examine the regional impact of refinances in the first round of quantitative easing
(QE). The authors ask whether QE refinance activity at lower rates amplified or
diminished regional economic differences. They find that in regions with low income and
low land prices, QE was less ineffective as a stimulus. Because of this differential
effectiveness, this refinance activity exacerbated inequality between regions.
These studies suggest that mortgage savings not only help households directly, but also
indirectly through local spillovers into home price appreciation. This suggests that risk-
based pricing, by decreasing mortgage rates for more creditworthy and typically
wealthier borrowers, and increasing the cost of debt for less creditworthy, typically less
wealthy borrowers, may amplify housing wealth inequality not only through the
differential cost of debt, but also because the spillovers of these savings can translate into
more quickly rising home prices. Spillovers of course are stronger when their effects are
clustered, so if borrowers are segregated by wealth or creditworthiness, this income
segregation may amplify the effect of risk-based pricing.
In the next section I measure housing wealth inequality nationally and as it varies
between and within CBSAs. I then describe how income sorting and risk-based pricing
interact to generate housing wealth inequality at the CBSA level. Subprime lending in the
1990s and early 2000s was an egregious example of mortgage pricing which was
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influenced by race and segregation with long lasting consequences for housing wealth. It
would be difficult to separately estimate the impact of racial segregation and risk-based
pricing prior to the collapse of the subprime mortgage market. The post-crisis period may
be easier timeframe in which to measure the impact of income segregation and risk-based
pricing on housing wealth, because almost all recent mortgage originations have been
conforming, and the vast majority of new mortgages are either held by the GSEs or
guaranteed by FHA/VA. For this reason, I estimate the impact of risk-based pricing and
income segregation on the accumulation of housing wealth from 2010-2015,
understanding that this period was one of moderate levels of risk-based pricing.
Methods and Data
To analyze the impact of mortgage pricing on housing wealth inequality independently of
racial discrimination in pricing, I look at individual data on mortgages originated in 2010,
during a period when many predatory mortgage originators had ceased doing business,
but when credit sorting and mortgage pricing policies were in effect. The choice of
timeframe should go a long way towards separating these two issues. I also use individual
level data and controls in addition to census tract and MSA level characteristics.
The dataset for this analysis is obtained from credit record and mortgage data. The
advantage of this over other sources of data on housing wealth like the American
Housing Survey, the Survey of Consumer Finances, or PSID is that this data has large
samples for each metropolitan area in the United States, permitting the construction of
housing wealth inequality metrics within each city, and analysis of how processeswithin
the metropolitan area affect housing wealth inequality. The other advantage of this
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dataset is it provides a longitudinal panel of administrative data on all sources of
mortgage debt, as well as other kinds of debt and financial and demographic information.
Disadvantages are that though coverage is good, home value information comes from
mortgage servicer data, which is a convenience sample, though I am able to mitigate this
problem by describing how the characteristics of the sample differ from the population.
The other disadvantage is that I have no data on homeowners who own their homes
outright, which the 2010-2014 ACS estimates as 34.4% of all homeowners. Due to this
data limitation, this analysis of housing wealth inequality is restricted to mortgaged
homeowners.
Credit record data is drawn from the FRBNY CCP. This panel randomly selects 5% of all
individuals with a credit record by SSN. I obtained records for June of 2015. I then
matched these records with the CRISM dataset. This dataset contained a convenience
sample of mortgage servicer’s administrative data with credit records obtained from
Lender Processing Services (LPS). I limit the CRISM data to just those records which are
contained in the randomly sampled FRBNY CCP dataset. It would be possible to use the
larger convenience sample of homeowners in the CRISM dataset, but by restricting the
sample to those which I can match with randomly selected credit records data, I am able
to evaluate how the data in the mortgage sample varies from the population. After
limiting the dataset to those in the FRBNY CCP random sample, I then exclude all
borrowers under the age of 18 or over 100, and limited the sample to counties within
CBSAs. This left 11.9M records, representing 238.2M adults.
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The FRBNY CCP contains data on first mortgages, close end seconds (home equity
loans) and home equity lines of credit. Both datasets show approximately 1.9M
individuals with mortgage debt, which translates to a population of 38.8M-38.6 M., or
16% of all records in the dataset. Using census data to check these figures, I find
approximately 49M mortgaged homes, which divided by the adult US population of
240M, is 20%.
As shown in Table 8, this dataset excludes homeowners with multiple properties.
Sampled homeowners have higher home equity installment balances and fewer home
equity lines of credit than the overall population. Sample homeowners’ first mortgage
balance is lower than average, with a mean balance of $162 compared to $200 thousand
dollars. Sampled homeowners are the same age, and have been homeowners just as long
as the average homeowner.




















Sample 1.14 1,832.54 9,186.99 199,708.09 10.37 51.67
In Sample 1.00 2,205.47 5,931.13 162,311.34 9.89 51.26
All
Mortgagees 1.08 1,982.06 7,881.59 184,714.30 10.18 51.50
The sample varies slightly by geography, with coverage as low as 35-40% in rural states
like VT, WV and MS, and as high as 65% in states like AZ, NV and MS. The breakdown
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by property type in the sample is 80% single family residences, 14% condos, townhouses,
or 2-4 unit residences, and the remainders are other or unknown.
I calculate housing wealth by taking the sale price or in the case of a refinance, the
appraised home value from LPS. I estimate the current value of the home by multiplying
the value at origination by CoreLogic’s single family combined, zip-code-level home
price index in the month of sale, and divide by the June 2015 HPI. I then subtract the total
balances of all mortgage and home equity debt from current home value to estimate
housing wealth.
Using the individual measures of housing wealth, I calculate aggregate housing wealth
inequality within each CBSA and analyze whether housing wealth inequality varies more
between or within urban region. Because housing wealth can take on negative and
positive values, I use indices that can accommodate negative values; the Gini coefficient
and GE(2), also referred to as half the squared coefficient of variation. GE(2) is one of
the family of generalized entropy indices. The factor 2 indicating the weight used in this
variant; generally, as this weight increases from 0 to 1 to 2, the index becomes more
sensitive towards wealthier members in the distribution (Jenkins & Jäntti, 2005; Salverda,
Nolan, & Smeeding, 2009). The formula for GE(2) is:
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Using the Gini coefficient and GE(2), I calculate housing wealth inequality for the over
300 metropolitan CBSAs nationwide.
After calculating descriptive statistics of how housing wealth varies by region across the
nation, I investigate the dynamics generating inequality within urban regions. I look at
whether mortgage pricing and income segregation increase housing wealth inequality,
and if there is an interaction between the two factors. The effect of income segregation on
housing wealth can vary non-linearly by household wealth. To understand how income
segregation and mortgage pricing affect housing wealth inequality throughout the
distribution, I perform a series of quantile regression analyses as depicted in equation 1.
Equation 1:
Housing Wealthijk 2015 = α + Mortgage Pricingijk2010 + Interaction Term + Income
Segregation k2010 + Individual Characteristicsijk 2015 + Census Tract Characteristicsjk2010 +
CBSA Characteristicsk2010 + εi
In this model, I estimate the impact of mortgage pricing and income segregation at
origination on 2015 housing wealth.
Income segregation is measured using the Riordan and Bischoff’s H index, a rank
information theory index which measures income segregation independently of income
inequality. The H index is constructed by ranking incomes in a region, calculating the
distribution of ranks within each census tract, and aggregating those figures. The index
varies between 0, in which case the distribution of ranks within each sub-area is
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equivalent, and 1 in which case there is no variation within any sub-area (Reardon &
Bischoff, 2011).
Summary statistics for this measure and for all variables are depicted in Table 9. Controls
include borrower age, income, non-housing debt, starting home value, and loan-to-value
at origination. At the neighborhood level, I control for 2010 census tract characteristics
for percent Black, percent Hispanic, percent vacancy, percent owner occupied, median
year built for residential homes, average commute times, the percent of adults over 25
with a bachelor’s degree, the labor participation rate, and population density. Finally, I
control for CBSA level characteristics: income segregation, the percentage of the Blacks
in the metropolitan population, and the White-Black dissimilarity indices.
To test whether income segregation amplifies the impact of mortgage pricing on housing
wealth inequality, I interact the measure of CBSA level income segregation with the
individual measure of mortgage price.
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Table 9: Data Sources Summary Statistics – 2010 Mortgage Originators
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Individual








Income Squared (000s) 4248.84 3337.33 0.00 56644.00
Age (Years) 50.75 13.07 18.00 101.00
Sale Price ($) $274,598 $350,956 $4,863 $100,000,000
Non-Housing Debt ($) $22,992 $32,681 $0 $2,011,815
Fico Score 737.87 79.11 395.00 818.00
Mortgage Interest Rate 4.59 0.55 1.00 12.09
Interaction MIR * IS 64.40 16.87 7.40 196.76
CBSA Level Income Segregation (H) 14.01 3.27 4.50 21.30 US 2010
Census Tract
Population Density 3661.43 8333.69 0.00 484979.10
ACS 2010-2014
% Black 8.91 14.74 0.00 100.00
% Hispanic 11.71 15.47 0.00 100.00
% Owner Occupied 74.53 17.75 0.00 100.00
% Percent Vacant 58.41 30.50 0.00 100.00
Median Year Built (Years) 1978 17 1939 2006
Average Commute Time (min) 26.37 6.29 8.00 79.00
% Over 25 with a B.A. 22.21 9.81 0.00 63.23
Adult Participation Rate 68.18 8.11 2.55 100.00
CBSA Level
White-Black Dissimilarity
Index 54.80 13.91 15.13 79.61 US 2010
% Black Population 14.32 9.40 0.22 52.56
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Results
A snapshot of urban housing wealth in 2015 reveals that housing wealth is very unequal.
Within CBSA inequality is much higher than between city inequality. Housing wealth is
clustered around a peak of $25,000, with half the distribution falling between
approximately $12,000 and $141,000 in housing equity.
Figure 7: Lorenz Curve of 2015 Housing Wealth Inequality, All Mortgaged
Homeowners.
Source: Author Calculations, CoreLogic, Equifax Credit Risk Insight Servicing McDash dataset,
which includes a link to data from McDash Analytics, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Black
Knight Financial Services, referred to hereon as (CRISM)
Figure 7 depicts the Lorenz curve for all homeowners in the sample. The overall Gini
coefficient is .683, far higher than the Gini coefficient for income in 2015, .4 (OECD,
2013), but lower than the overall wealth inequality, which was estimated in 2008 at .801.
Note that a portion of the Lorenz curve falls below zero, indicating substantial levels of
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negative wealth. Broken down by urban region, this negative equity generates Gini
coefficients higher than 1 in several areas.
In this dataset, the 90/50 ratio is around 4. By comparison, Mian and Sufi use PSID data
and find that the ratio of housing wealth from the wealthiest 20% to the middle 20% has
risen to 9. Using another metric of housing wealth inequality, half the square of the
coefficient of variation, the overall GE(2) is 3.258. Decomposing the entropy index by
CBSA shows that inequality is much higher within CBSAs at 3.127 than between
CBSAs, at .132.
Figure 8 depicts the Gini coefficients by CBSA. Note that where mean wealth is negative,
Gini indices are also below zero; and CBSAs with mean wealth close to zero create
instability in both half the squared coefficient of variance and in the Gini index. This
effect generates extremely high inequality indices which should be interpreted cautiously.
Figure 8: Gini Coefficients, Housing Wealth of Mortgaged Homes, by CBSA
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Source: Author Calculations, CoreLogic, Equifax Credit Risk Insight Servicing McDash dataset, which
includes a link to data from McDash Analytics, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Black Knight Financial
Services, referred to hereon as (CRISM)
The Gini coefficient can be interpreted as the predicted inequality between two randomly
selected households. So, a Gini coefficient of .6 indicates that if one were to select at
random two households, one will be 60% less than the other. In Figure 5, we see that
areas shaded in darker blue Gini index above 1, indicating extremely high levels of
negative equity. These high values are predominant in Florida, the Chicago area, and
Southern California where home appreciation since the crisis has been strong, but pockets
of negative equity remain. Overall this map demonstrates that there is a strong spatial
component to housing wealth inequality, and the ability to use homeownership as an
opportunity to build wealth is not evenly distributed across the country. Some places have
higher risks than others.
The next analysis attempts to uncover one driver of regional housing wealth inequality. In
the introduction, I discuss how income sorting is a likely cause of uneven housing wealth
appreciation and can amplify inequities in mortgage pricing. Using a quantile regression,
I investigate how and whether risk-based pricing interact with income segregation to
increase inequality within a given metropolitan area.
In Figure 9 I show the results of a series of quantile regressions of housing wealth using
just two regional factors: the isolation of poverty and wealth. We see that the isolation of
poverty is correlated with higher housing wealth for all households, but most particularly
the wealthy. Isolation of affluence, by contrast, decreases housing wealth of most
households, but benefits those at the 75th percentile and above.
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Figure 9: The Impact of Isolation of Poverty and Affluence on Housing Wealth
Table 10 uses the same dataset and displays a more extensive model. The table shows the
coefficients obtained from quantile regressions at the 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and
95th percentiles. The R-squared ranges from .10 to .70, and the model appears to explain
more variance at the higher than lower end of the housing wealth spectrum. Significance
is calculated at the 95% level and all results that are significant at less than .05% are
shaded beige.
The results show that typically, older home buyers have higher housing wealth, possibly
because they have higher down payments. Sale price increases home equity overall, as
expected. Non-housing debt is a tradeoff against home equity. At the lower end of the
1st 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th
Isolation of Poverty $27,501 $19,814 $40,305 $71,020 $136,375 $234,291 $648,219













spectrum, every dollar of debt reduces home equity by 9%. At the higher end, non-
housing debt corresponds with higher home equity. Neighborhood population density,
and higher minority populations have small but consistently negative coefficients, with
each additional percent minority in a census tract reducing housing wealth by up to $121
over the 5 years of ownership. Measures of owner occupancy and vacancy perform have
little impact at the neighborhood level, with coefficients that are small and insignificant.
Neighborhoods with newer housing have lower housing wealth for homeowners at the
bottom of the spectrum, with home equity declining by $47-$82 for each year, but
increasing for homeowners in the top two percentiles by up to $100. This factor could be
related to construction in the 2000s, which tended to be in exurban areas where home
prices have not risen quickly; and in sunbelt cities that have not experienced the strong
home price surges of supply constrained regions.
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Table 10: Quantile Regression Results
Predicted: Housing Wealth, 2015 5th 10th 25th Median 75% 90th 95th
Individual
Income (000s) -1,628.79 -1,844.67 -2,503.43 -4,038.93 -6,272.32 -7,337.88 -6,583.82
Income Squared (000s) 8.58 10.55 13.97 21.49 32.65 37.18 32.64
Age (Years) 250.67 378.48 648.35 956.1 1,063.24 790.91 525.7
Sale Price ($) 0.22 0.27 0.39 0.6 0.85 1.01 1.03
Non-Housing Debt ($) -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.15
Fico Score 103.11 100.98 128.5 158.65 172.64 160.91 154.52
Mortgage Interest Rate -14,049.48 -15,682.98 -23,216.37 -28,261.86 -28,132.67 -15,498.90 -10,975.39
Interaction: Mort. Interest Rate *
Income Segregation
250.95 339.65 545.9 401.25 367.22 -5.21 75.31
CBSA Level Income Segregation (H) -1,020.40 -1,497.91 -2,429.31 -1,654.53 -1,189.23 866.17 962.07
Census
Tract
Population Density -0.19 -0.25 -0.32 -0.54 -0.41 -0.4 -0.3
% Black -47.91 -35.84 -52.91 -27.79 -31.23 -67.22 -53.12
% Hispanic -46 -67.48 -63.12 -28.1 -48.75 -76.56 -121.32
% Owner Occupied 2.56 -0.01 13.59 6.11 -5.93 -18.38 -16.77
% Percent Vacant -5.68 -5.88 1.27 -8.15 -15.11 -5.59 -1.8
Median Year Built (Years) -22.95 -47 -68.44 -81.52 -75.12 51.86 100.8
Average Commute Time (min) -347.95 -301.18 -351.05 -268.66 64.28 108.71 156.26
% Over 25 with a B.A. 183.42 144.67 228.98 359.19 561.81 655.74 717.58
Adult Participation Rate 31.82 2.12 -33.86 -60.36 -22.66 53.04 -77.66
CBSA Level
White-Black Dissimilarity Index 206.22 179.84 224.75 309.92 373.84 316.81 182.02
% Black Population 83.78 74.13 86.77 60.66 10.62 -33.54 -24.65
Constant Constant 45,343.91 106,396.09 165,650.84 214,447.79 234,853.93 -15,866.78 -119,599.55
N 70,465.00 70,465.00 70,465.00 70,465.00 70,465.00 70,465.00 70,465.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.1 0.15 0.26 0.39 0.52 0.63 0.7
Predicted Housing Wealth at the Joint Means $30,128 $43,326 $70,365 $111,740 $163,563 $207,948 $231,308
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Commute times have a stronger impact, with each additional minute of commute time
reducing housing wealth by as much as $351. This effect is stronger at the lower end of
the spectrum and dissipates for those in the 75th percentile and above, for whom higher
commute times are associated with increased equity.
Table 11 breaks out the impact of increases in mortgage pricing and/or income
segregation on housing wealth inequality. The results for mortgage pricing show that the
price of debt has a powerful effect on housing wealth. In a hypothetical city with no
income segregation, a mortgage rate increase by .55 basis points, or one standard
deviation, reduces housing wealth by between -$15,500 to -$6,000. At the bottom of the
spectrum, this sort of increase costs homeowners -27% of housing wealth over the 5-year
period, but at the top of the spectrum the impact is just -3%.
In a hypothetical city where the price of debt is zero, a rise in income segregation costs
those with lower housing wealth -$3,333 or -4% at the 10th percentile and -$7,900 and -
6% at the median, but increases housing wealth by 1%, or $2,800 and $3,100, for those in
the 90th and 95th percentiles.
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Table 11: Effect of joint increases in income segregation and risk-based pricing
5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
Effect of an increase in mortgage rate with IS set to zero
$ -$7,718 -$8,615 -$12,754 -$15,525 -$15,454 -$8,514 -$6,029
% of HW -27% -20% -18% -14% -10% -4% -3%
Effect of an increase in income sorting with mortgage rates set to zero
$ -$3,333 -$4,893 -$7,935 -$5,404 -$3,884 $2,829 $3,142
% of HW -4% -5% -6% -3% -1% 1% 1%
Effect of an increase in mortgage rate and income sorting at joint means
$ -$6,817 -$7,777 -$11,478 -$14,160 -$13,143 -$5,773 -$1,616
% of HW -23% -18% -16% -13% -8% -3% -1%
The last two rows of Table 11 show the effect of increasing risk-based pricing and
income segregation simultaneously. The interaction terms for mortgage pricing and
income segregation are significant in the lower half of the spectrum, for regressions at the
10th through 50th percentiles. The combined effect of mortgage pricing and income
segregation is to widen inequality – reducing housing wealth most for those who have
less to begin with. I obtain these effects by predicting housing wealth for each set of
coefficients at the joint means. I then find the impact of an increase by one standard
deviation in both income segregation and risk-based pricing at joint means. The change is
-$7,700 and -$11,000 for those in the 10th and 25th percentiles, respectively. But this
downward effect decays for those with more housing wealth, so that those at the 90th
percentile lose less – at the 95th percentile, just -$1,600 – from income segregation and
the interaction with risk-based pricing. Expressed as a percent of housing wealth, the
effects on inequality are clear. At the bottom of the spectrum, homeowners would have -
23% less home equity over the 5-year period. At the top of the spectrum, homeowners
lose just -1%.
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The remaining results in Table 11 add to our understanding of the impact of race and
racial segregation on housing wealth inequality. The coefficients for MSA level Black
segregation and percent Black within a city are both positive, suggesting that home
purchasers in 2010 across the spectrum benefited from racial segregation. Black
segregation is associated with approximately $200-$300 higher accumulation of housing
wealth across the 5-year period. Black segregation does not appear to benefit some
borrowers more than others; as a percentage of wealth, Black segregation helps those in
the lower percentiles more than those at the top. In all likelihood, this impact has to do
with the composition of 2010 homebuyers and mortgage originators, who, due to credit
tightness in 2010 and the ravages of subprime lending on minority home-owning
communities, tended to be wealthier and Whiter than the general population. A
suggestion for future analyses is to take advantage of HMDA data to understand the
impact of racial segregation for mortgage originators of different races; or to examine the
interaction between racial segregation and other factors such as census tract level
demographics and income.
Similarly, percentage Black in an MSA seems to improve home equity for mortgage
originators at the bottom of the spectrum, but has no effect, or a negative effect for those
at the top. It is possible that this result reflects some gentrification during the period; in
the few predominantly Black neighborhoods where low priced homes were purchased in
2010 may have been those that were gentrifying, and in those places, prices rose quickly
between 2010 and 2015.
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Conclusion
Wealth inequality has risen to levels not seen in the last century, and is linked to wider
macroeconomic problem of secular stagnation. Housing wealth is the largest type of asset
in the United States, and is the cornerstone of middle class wealth. Decentralized income
segregation is rising in the United States, and current policy discussions around the
disposition of the GSEs lean towards more privatized solutions with higher potential for
steeper risk-based pricing. These results demonstrate that in combination, these rising
factors will amplify housing wealth inequality.
These results quantify the monetary impacts of racial and income segregation, and point
to how the institutional framework of homeownership in this country allocates housing
wealth by place, race, and class. There are political ramifications to this work: if one
group is systematically able to benefit from housing as an investment, while another is
not, this uneven set of opportunities could pit the two groups against one another in a
political competition for control of urban space. This work also shows how housing and
mortgage markets contribute to the material basis for the formation of conflicting
political interests (Aalbers, 2008; G. Dymski et al., 2013; Fox O'mahony & Overton,
2014; Thorns, 1981).
This research also makes it clear that the potential for wealth accumulation differs by
urban region, with Southern California and Florida metro areas leading the nation in
housing wealth inequality. These stark differences suggest that investigating spatial
variation in housing wealth inequality can help us understand which policies will even
the playing field. The impact of risk-based pricing on housing wealth inequality suggests
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that housing finance reform should be evaluated on whether it will contribute to rising
inequality. If mortgage policy then also interacts with rising income segregation, then
inclusionary zoning and a commitment to creating mixed income communities may be
key tools not only for promoting affordable housing, but for resolving larger
macroeconomic issues by reducing housing wealth in the United States.
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Chapter 5: Summary
American families’ wealth is bound up in their housing, and we know from research at
the national level that housing wealth is becoming more unequal. This research places
widening housing wealth inequality in an urban context. Cities structure housing markets,
from the production of new buildings to residential patterns to the provision of services
and opportunities. The institutional arrangements that underpin mortgage markets vary by
state and region as well, either because of activity in the private market, or because of the
influence state chartering systems have on the banking system. In this research, for the
first time, I calculate housing wealth inequality at the regional level and show that it
varies widely by urban region, confirming that regional housing dynamics structure
opportunities for homeowners to accumulate wealth.
Some theories suggest that income translates straightforwardly to housing wealth, leading
to the prediction that housing wealth inequality would closely track income inequality.
This research contradicts those theories. Instead, in the 2000-2005 era, I find that housing
wealth does not have a strong link with income inequality. By contrast, segregation of the
wealthy and Black isolation are associated with higher housing wealth inequality. Black
isolation had a far stronger effect on housing wealth inequality than other forms of racial
segregation, ethnic segregation, or economic segregation. This finding underscores the
importance of Fair Housing law, and demonstrates that legislation to reduce exclusionary
zoning, which other research has tied to racial segregation, will be a crucial aspect of
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ensuring that housing wealth is a path to saving for the American middle class. This issue
will be particularly pressing in an era of rising urban land prices and declining
affordability.
The third chapter focuses on mortgage markets and segregation, examining the impact of
subprime lending on housing wealth inequality between 2000 and 2015. This research is
one of few analyses on the widening housing wealth gap over the last few years, and is
the first study to frame this as an urban phenomenon. I find that overall housing wealth
inequality changed dramatically over this time period, increasing by .11 Gini coefficients.
In a regression analysis, I find that changes in income inequality predict changes in
housing wealth inequality over the period, as well as changes in Black and Hispanic
minority populations. This suggests that while the level of income inequality may have a
slight relationship with housing wealth inequality, changes in income inequality are
closely tied to changes in housing wealth inequality.
In this model, I had expected that the mortgage crisis would explain much of the
association between Black segregation and housing wealth inequality. Contrary to my
expectation, the incremental inclusion of metrics for subprime lending and post-crisis
vacant homes does not deflate the effect of Black isolation, though it reduced the
coefficient for Hispanic isolation as expected. These results suggest that there is
something else about the crisis and recovery period other than subprime lending and the
density of foreclosures which exacerbated housing wealth inequality in cities where
Black isolation increased. One possibility is that the recovery period itself unfolded in
ways that exacerbated racial inequality in housing wealth above and beyond the subprime
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and foreclosure crises. Further research into the distribution of recovery policies and
market responses such as REO-to-Rental, Quantitative Easing and HARP refinances are
needed. The final analysis of this research examines the distributional impacts of risk-
based pricing during the recovery period more closely.
In the fourth chapter, I examine housing wealth inequality in an individual-level analysis,
focusing on interactions between risk-based mortgage pricing and income segregation
during the housing market recovery period of 2010 to 2015. I find that both income
segregation and mortgage pricing are significant, with large effects on widening housing
wealth inequality. The interaction between the two factors is significant for regressions in
the bottom half of the distribution. This interaction could be because risk-based pricing
increases incentives for credit sorting and disparate home price appreciation; because it
increases disposable incomes and economic health, and home prices in wealthier enclaves
relative to other communities; or both. Further research is needed to disentangle these
effects.
The results of Chapter 4 demonstrate that even in 2010, a period with slight levels of risk-
based pricing, increases in mortgage rates have measurable and large effects on housing
wealth inequality even absent the excesses of predatory practices. They also show that
income segregation has a separate effect on inequality. This suggests that efforts to
reduce spatial inequality are important, either by improving access to housing in good
neighborhoods for low income families, or by increasing the equality of provision of
public goods within a city. In addition to concerns about educational quality, access to
services, access to employment, political polarization, and a host of other social ills, this
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research adds rising wealth inequality to the list of negative impacts of increasing
economic segregation.
These results reveal conflicting financial interests among borrowers and among
neighborhoods with regard to segregation and sorting. Institutional theory places the
potential to accumulate wealth at the center of class formation. If different groups, be
they renters and owners or neighborhoods segregated by race, are differentially able to
accumulate wealth through property ownership, this differential can frame political
struggles within urban areas. That said, material concerns do not always translate
predictably into political action. Other research has found that negative equity was a
strong predictor of increased support for the GOP candidate in 2016 over 2012
(Raymond, 2017), even though the Republican candidate was far less likely to enact
policies at the federal level to help repair home equity for underwater borrowers.
Taken as a whole, this research has clear ramifications for policies which impact
socioeconomic and racial/ethnic segregation. Conventional zoning has many attributes
that restrict density: mandatory parking, minimum lot sizes, specified housing type and
density, and restrictions on infill development (Talen, 2013). This sort of density zoning
corresponds with substantial increases in economic segregation, particularly the isolation
of affluence (Lens & Monkkonen, 2016; J. T. Rothwell & Massey, 2010). One tool to
combat the formation of local enclaves is inclusionary zoning, which offers developers
density bonuses in exchange for increased numbers of affordable units, or can even
require that new development include a certain percentage of affordable units.
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The results of this research shows that wealthy homeowners have strong financial
incentives to pursue exclusionary zoning in their neighborhood (Lens & Monkkonen,
2016; J. T. Rothwell & Massey, 2010). Lens and Monkkonen (2016) find that
municipalities are often under considerable pressure to conform with the wishes of
wealthy enclaves. For this reason, solutions which use incentives and are implemented at
the municipal level may founder on political barriers. In this case, state legislatures can
be particularly useful in pressuring cities to reduce income segregation, though obviously
this only applies in places where there is an appetite for government support of affordable
housing at the state level. Policies formulated at the state level that are also mandatory
rather than voluntary hold promise. These tools include laws like the Massachusetts
Comprehensive Permit Act, that grants developers the right to sidestep local zoning and
other restrictions and obtain permits to develop affordable housing in localities that do
not have a certain percentage of affordable housing (J. Rothwell, 2012).
In addition to ramifications for local zoning, this research has mortgage policy
implications. There’s been substantial research on the effect of predatory lending and
risk-based pricing on equity during the financial crisis. The final empirical chapter of this
research examines the impact of risk-based pricing during the recovery, a moment of low
risk-based pricing. In Chapter 4, we find that not only does mortgage pricing affect
housing wealth inequality, but there is a significant interaction with income segregation.
This suggests that state and federal policies that reduce risk-based pricing overall, or by
reducing mortgage interest rates for low income borrowers, may help slow widening
housing wealth inequality.
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The largest such program is the mortgage interest tax deduction. The mortgage interest
tax deduction is a program which allows homeowners who itemize deductions to deduct
their mortgage interest payments from their taxes. The second largest is the GSE’s
residential mortgage business, and after that, FHA/VA mortgage insurance. The federal
government also supports mortgage revenue bonds issued at the state and municipal
level, and is responsible for programs which are distributed at the state and local level
like Community Development Blog Grant (CDBG), HOME Investment Partnerships
Program (HOME), the Community Development Finance Institutions Fund (CDFI) and
others (Collins, 2007).
There’s a substantial body of research critiquing the distributional consequences of the
mortgage interest tax deduction; this study doesn’t specifically address tax benefits or add
to that research strain. This research does find that slight increases in mortgage interest
rates have a regressive effect. Because this research centers predominantly on the impact
of mortgage interest rate pricing on wealth inequality, they shed light on mortgage
revenue bonds, the GSEs, and other programs that reduce mortgage interest rates.
These results on the impact of mortgage pricing on housing wealth inequality have
ramifications for housing finance reform. The GSEs have long subsidized the creation of
low, fixed-rate mortgage loans, thereby increasing homeownership by lowering costs for
most borrowers and reducing risk-based pricing and market segmentation in mortgage
markets. This was accomplished by cross-subsidizing costs between borrowers of
different incomes and risk tiers. Under conservatorship, the GSEs have moved away from
providing one rate for most of the mortgage market towards slight risk-based pricing, but
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significant cross-subsidization still occurs. The current administration has proposed to
reduce regulation on mortgage markets and may seek to privatize or restructure the GSEs.
Privatization proposals range from structures that would create competition among
guarantors to a system in which shareholders invest in a highly regulated entity, among
others (Parrott, Ranieri, Sperling, Zandi, & Zigas, 2016). Reform efforts seem very
focused on attempting to limit the incentives of the GSEs to take on systemic risk, but
may not be adequately addressing the impact on homeownership and mortgage pricing in
the primary market. It is difficult to cross-subsidize risk in privatized models because
competition leads to cherry-picking of low risk borrowers with cheaper prices and market
segmentation as different firms serve different tiers of the market (Immergluck, 2015b).
This research shows that increases in risk-based pricing have powerful distributional
effects and are among the strongest factors in widening housing wealth inequality. These
strong impacts of mortgage pricing on housing wealth inequality are obtained from a
sample of mortgages issued in 2010, a moment of modest risk-based pricing. Some
proposals for privatization of the GSEs would result in far higher levels of risk-based
pricing and market segmentation.
The other ways in which privatization could affect mortgage markets is through state and
local mortgage revenue bonds. Mortgage revenue bonds are financial instruments that are
sold to investors to subsidize the finance of mortgage loans to low income borrowers.
These bonds are targeted at Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize and provide credit
enhancement to state and municipal mortgage revenue bonds, deepening investor interest,
and invest directly in these products, guaranteeing a market for state and municipal debt
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that is passed onto low income homeowners in the form of below market rate mortgages
for low income borrowers. Preserving these functions during housing reform will allow
states and municipalities to reduce risk-based pricing, and slow rising wealth inequality
in the coming era. Finally, recent budgets have called for strong cuts or complete
elimination of Community Development Blog Grants (CDBG) and HOME Investment
Partnerships. These programs are used for an array of projects, among them the support
of affordable homeownership. For this and other reasons, these programs should be
preserved.
The challenge of providing safe, affordable residential mortgages with progressive or at
least less regressive pricing may also be met at the state and local level. The importance
of urban factors and urban policy on housing wealth inequality presents an opportunity
for urban planners and policy makers, though it should be noted that states and cities have
not always pursued equality of opportunity in the absence of federal protections.  Even in
the absence of federal support for affordable housing, decisions around zoning,
affordable housing, and equality of opportunity made at the local level can generate a
more equitable set of opportunities for homeowners.
States and municipalities should seek to extend mortgage bond revenue programs to
combat wealth inequality at the local level. State and municipal housing finance agencies
can increasingly fund mortgage revenue bond programs to prove a credit enhancement
for borrowers. Local actors can also fund programs to provide down payment assistance,
which would help reduce the mortgage interest rate borrowers qualify for in a private
market. This funding has sometimes come from CDBG and HOME.
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In addition to highlighting the need for progressive housing finance reform, and efforts to
reduce urban segregation and sorting, this research casts wealth inequality not as a
national or individual phenomenon, but in a spatial context. Housing wealth is the result
of multiple trends at different levels of urban governance and structure. Income and racial
segregation are the result of individual decisions as well as municipal and regional policy
choices around provision of public goods, jurisdictional fragmentation, and urban form.
From the excesses of predatory practices during the subprime lending crisis, to risk-
based pricing, mortgage policy has powerful effects on housing wealth inequality, and is
the result of a patchwork of state and federal laws and institutions interacting with the
private financial institutions that help originate and invest in mortgages, from small banks
to global financial conglomerates. In an era of rising income sorting and increasingly
deregulated mortgage markets, I confirm that both factors independently increase housing
wealth inequality and significantly interact with one another.
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